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Abstract  
The objective of this paper is to examine the predictability of the monetary policy decisions of 
the Governing Council of the ECB and the transmission of the unexpected component of the 
monetary policy decisions to the yield curve. We find, using new methodologies, that markets 
do not fully predict the ECB decisions but the lack of perfect predictability is comparable with 
the results found for the United States Federal Reserve. We also find that the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on bond yields declines with the maturity of the bonds, and that this 
impact is significantly lower when the shock stems from a monetary policy meeting of the ECB. 
Using implicit rates instead of bond yields, we find evidence that the market views the ECB as 
credible. 
 
Keywords: Predictability, monetary policy shocks, principal components, transmission of 
monetary policy, yield curve. 
JEL classification: C22, E52 
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Executive Summary: 
The objective of this paper is to examine the predictability of the monetary policy decisions of 
the Governing Council of the ECB and the transmission of the unexpected component of its 
monetary policy decisions to the yield curve. With respect to the first goal, the predictability 
analysis, we apply a battery of tests and we conclude that the markets have predicted the 
monetary policy decisions of the ECB rather well. However, the results do not accept the 
hypothesis of perfect predictability. To evaluate the magnitude of the deviations from this 
hypothesis, applying the same battery of tests, we draw a comparison of these results and those 
obtained on the predictability of the monetary policy decisions of the United States Federal 
Reserve during the same period. We provide evidence that the predictability of both central banks 
is broadly similar. 
With respect to the second objective, we analyse the impact of the unexpected component of the 
monetary policy decisions on the term structure of interest rates in the euro area. We use series of 
daily monetary policy shocks in the euro area in which the observations on the days of the 
monetary policy meetings of the ECB are the unexpected component of the monetary policy 
decisions. This allows us to identify the impact of the surprise part of a monetary policy decision 
on the yield curve and compare it to the normal response of the yield curve to other daily shocks. 
We show that the impact of the daily monetary policy shocks on bond yields declines with the 
maturity of the bonds, and that this impact is significantly lower when the shock stems from a 
monetary policy meeting of the ECB. Using implicit rates instead of bond yields, we find 
evidence that the market views the ECB as credible. 
In addition to the former contributions, the paper presents a new methodology to approach the 
problem of measuring monetary policy shocks and predictability of central bank decisions. The 
contributions can be summarise as follows: 
First, as a difference to other standard papers in the literature, we use daily data and consider all 
days, not only meeting days “T” days before the meetings. Our purpose with this approach is 
twofold. First, to have daily series of monetary policy shocks which can be interpreted as how 
market participants change the expected path of monetary policy interest rates on a daily basis (at 
different horizons) as new information becomes available. Second and taking advantage of this 
series, to test for the significance of the shocks associated with the monetary policy meetings 
compared to the shocks produced on any other day. 
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Second, we gather information about the shocks from different money market interest rates, 
avoiding the liquidity (and potentially other) consideration(s) unrelated to monetary policy 
expectations that affect the individual series. We comprise the information of the different rates 
by using principal components. This approach allows us to get a rich variety of conclusions on 
how the new daily information affects the expected path of monetary policy rates at different 
horizons. For example, we show that the impact of monetary policy decisions (either to change 
the key ECB interest rates or to maintain them unchanged) can be considered surprises when we 
use very short-term rates but not so when using longer-term rates. We see this as evidence 
showing that the surprises on monetary policy decisions might be more related to the timing of 
the decisions than to the decision itself.  
Third, we measure the predictability of the monetary policy decisions of a central bank from 
different points of view by using different techniques in order to check the robustness of our 
findings. These techniques go from a graphical intuition to an EGARCH specification for the 
principal components of the series, going through an heuristic approach based on a weighted 
average of the possible outcomes, an analysis of the probabilities of change based on a probit 
specification and linear regressions for the transmission mechanism. 
Finally, to our knowledge the paper presents the most comprehensive approach to compare the 
euro area and the US in terms of the amount of information used, a preliminary analysis of the 
series in order to take into account the differences due to maturity, liquidity, etc., the variety of 
techniques used and the robustness of the results. 
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1. Introduction 
Not so long ago central banks gave little weight to being transparent; providing timely, open and 
clear information on their mandate, strategy, assessment and decisions to the public. 3 This has 
changed significantly in the recent past for good reasons and today transparency is viewed as a 
very important component of the monetary policy framework of a central bank.  
One of these reasons is related to the notion of credibility. Credibility is ultimately driven by the 
ability and track record of the central bank in fulfilling its mandate, and can be defined as the 
belief on the side of the public that price stability will be maintained over the medium term. 
Transparency helps central banks to foster their credibility.  
Another important reason stems from the finding that that forward-looking economic agents have 
relevant methodological consequences for the monetary transmission mechanism (see McCallum, 
1999, 2001). If the market4 fully understands the role of a central bank, the belief in the 
commitment to maintaining price stability over the medium term should anchor inflation 
expectations and induce a ‘rule like’ behaviour on the part of market participants. This would 
lead the market to react to the new information changing their expected path of monetary policy 
rates in a way consistent with the monetary policy strategy of the central bank. By being 
transparent, expectations on the path of future monetary policy decisions are formed more 
efficiently and accurately. 
The policy makers understand this and have stressed their commitment to stand up to the 
challenge. For example, in the words of a monetary policy maker in the euro area, “when the 
markets correctly anticipate that a new piece of information will lead to a change in official 
interest rates they will do much of the work themselves through a change in the term structure”, 
Issing (1999). 
Has this been the case? Ideally, it could be considered that the relevant question to be answered is 
to what extent the market expectation on the future path of monetary policy rates is broadly in 
line with the view of the central bank at every point in time. However, it is not possible to know 
                                                           
3  There are many definitions of transparency in the literature. In King et al (1998) it is defined it as a “process by 
which information about existing conditions, decisions, and actions is made accessible, visible, and 
understandable”. This definition is broadly in line with Winkler (2000), where transparency is (“broadly and 
loosely”) defined as the “degree of genuine understanding of the monetary policy process and policy decisions by 
the public”. Several authors (Eijffinger and Geraats (2002), Gerbach and Hahn (2002)) have useful discussions 
about the different aspects of transparency. 
4  While the distinction between market participants and the public at large is relevant for the communication of a 
central bank, given the empirical nature of the paper, we will concentrate on market participants. 
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the view on the expected path of monetary policy rates that a central bank has in mind at every 
point in time. 
Instead, we turn our attention to a closely related concept, the predictability of a central bank. We 
can define predictability as the ability of the public to correctly anticipate the monetary policy 
decisions of a central bank. By becoming more predictable, a central bank gains the ability to 
influence interest rates before the announcement of its monetary policy decisions. 
Predictability is sometimes viewed as a necessary consequence of transparency. In this vein, the 
degree of predictability of a central bank is thus sometimes seen as a way of measuring whether it 
is transparent. 5 For example, Poole and Raasche (2001) argue that with complete transparency, 
the monetary policy decisions of a central bank should be fully predictable. In fact, they test the 
predictability of the Fed by checking to what extent monetary policy decisions affect market 
rates, as their view is that policy announcements should not provide information to market 
participants, and thereby should not trigger any reaction of asset prices. 
It is clear that a higher degree of transparency should be connected to a higher degree of 
predictability. However, it can also be argued that perfect predictability might not be fully 
attainable in a world of uncertainty. The decision making process of monetary policy is a 
complex one in which all relevant pieces of information have to be assessed in the light of their 
implications for the monetary policy mandate. Given that the outcome of the process of mapping 
all the information on the state and the functioning of the economy (which is inherently 
uncertain) to take monetary policy decisions is based on judgement and is not done mechanically, 
it could be argued that a certain lack of predictability might not necessarily be related to a lack of 
transparency. Some authors also argue that when the decision is a collective one, as in the case of 
the European Central Bank (ECB), full transparency (in fact, operational transparency) may not 
be reached. 6 In this same vein, the precise timing of monetary policy decisions may be hard to 
anticipate perfectly, especially if monetary policy meetings are held very frequently, as was the 
case for the Governing Council of the ECB before November 2001. 7  
                                                           
5  Other considerations are important determinants of predictability, such as gradualism in interest rate decisions 
(Lange, Sack and Wicksell (2001)). 
6  See Cuikerman (2000). In addition, Winkler (2001) holds the view that as the monetary policy in the euro area is a 
relatively new event the level of common language and understanding between the central bank and market 
participants still needs to be fully tuned.  
7  Until 8 November 2001, the Governing Council of the ECB held monetary policy discussions at all of its meetings, 
generally every two weeks. Since then, it has discussed monetary policy issues only once a month. 
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Whilst in a world of uncertainty policy actions will most likely never be fully predictable, from 
the point of view of central bank it is important to avoid being unpredictable (or perhaps more 
importantly, to avoid that market uncertainty increases because of an incorrect interpretation of 
its own behaviour). This calls for the need for a continuous effort to be transparent, communicate 
effectively and provide active guidance to the markets explaining its policy decisions.8 In fact, 
central banks care about predictability. This paper analyses to what extent the markets have 
anticipated the monetary policy decisions of the ECB. 
There is not one single approach to measure predictability in the empirical literature. A great deal 
of work has been done to measure the predictability of monetary policy decisions in the United 
States and some European countries prior to the Monetary Union.9 However, the predictability of 
the monetary policy decisions of the ECB has not been tested extensively, partly due to the 
relatively short period of time in which the ECB has been conducting the single monetary policy 
in the euro area. To our knowledge, two papers, Gaspar, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2001), 
Hartman, Manna and Manzanares (2001) have analysed it and found evidence indicating that 
financial markets have generally understood and predicted the monetary policy decisions of the 
ECB. 10 
Interpreting the results is not easy. While perfect predictability is the clearest benchmark that 
comes to our mind, given the above arguments it might not be too realistic. For this reason, we 
also provide some evidence on the predictability of the United States Federal Reserve (Fed), 
which allows for a rouge comparison between the two central banks. However, as the literature 
has typically found that predictability is an evolving process, and that the market has improved its 
ability to predict the monetary policy decisions over time,11 perhaps not enough time has passed 
yet for the ECB.  
                                                           
8  Not surprising the markets cannot be an objective itself of monetary policy, following what market participants 
expect, regardless of the view the central bank holds on its assessment of the likelihood of reaching its objective. 
As Blinder puts it: “markets tend to overreact, are susceptible to fads and speculative bubbles, and seem to be have 
more short-term horizons than central bankers.” While central banks should not have any interest in surprising the 
markets, it might be unavoidable on some occasions. 
9  For example, for the Fed, among others, Roley and Sellon (1998), Poole and Raasche (2001), Kuttner (2001), 
Poole, Raasche and Thornton (2002), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002); For the Bank of England, Haldane and Read 
(1999); for a series of European countries prior to the Monetary Union and the United States, see Favero et al 
(1998) and Buttiglione et al (1998). 
10  Ross (2002) extends the analysis of Gaspar, Perez Quiros and Sicilia (2001) for the ECB and compares the 
predictability of the ECB with the one of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. Bernhardsen and Kloster 
(2002) also compare the predictability of several central banks using changes in the three-month interest rates. 
11  For the United States (see references in footnote 9) a common finding is that the predictability of Fed’s actions 
increased after the decision to announce changes in Fed policy rates immediately after FOMC meetings. In turn 
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As regards the second objective, we analyse the transmission of the unexpected component of the 
monetary decisions of the ECB to the term structure of interest rates. The reaction of the yield 
curve to the unexpected component of the monetary policy decisions at the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) has been used in the literature (Roley and Sellon (1998), Poole and Raasche 
(2001), Kuttner (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002)) to analyse the predictability of the Fed. 
Besides applying this analysis to the monetary policy decisions of the ECB, taking advantage of 
the series of daily monetary policy shocks estimated to assess predictability, our contribution is to 
study how the unexpected component of the monetary policy decisions has affected the term 
structure of interest rates compared to the normal impact of shocks on other days with no 
monetary policy decisions.  
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we present a simple heuristic approach to assess 
how well market participants have predicted the monetary policy decisions of the ECB before the 
meeting of the Governing Council. In section 3 we define series of daily monetary policy shocks 
in the euro area applying principal components to an array of daily money market data. We 
consider this approach a good way of summarising all the information contained in the money 
market and we present it in a way in which the predictability can be analysed. These series will 
be of particular importance, as they will allow us to measure to what extent monetary policy 
decisions have moved short-term money market rates (i.e. how have they surprised the markets), 
as compared to the normal behaviour of these rates. Section 4 analyses, using an EGARCH, how 
the monetary policy meetings of the Governing Council have changed the volatility pattern of 
these monetary policy shocks. Throughout these sections, to find a benchmark with which to 
compare the predictability results for the ECB, we apply (the same battery of) measures of 
predictability to the Fed. In Section 5 we analyse the reaction of the term structure of the euro 
area to the daily shocks and to the unexpected component of the monetary policy decisions of the 
ECB (the shocks on the days of the monetary policy meetings of the ECB). Section 6 sums up 
and concludes. 
 
2. Heuristic approach to measure the predictability of the monetary policy decisions 
A rather intuitive approach is to analyse to what extent market participants have predicted the 
monetary policy decisions taken shortly before the meeting. Gaspar, Quiros and Sicilia (2001) 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Haldane and Read (1999) show that the introduction of inflation targeting in the Bank of England improved the 
predictability of its monetary policy decisions. 
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used the EONIA12 to calculate the probability attached to a change in the key ECB interest rates 
before the meetings of the Governing Council. However, the high volatility of the EONIA and 
the impact of liquidity considerations in its pattern of behaviour, like when underbidding 
episodes occur (Bindseil 2002), argue in favour of using other short-term interest rates to assess 
market expectations. The very short end of the money market curve, and in particular the EONIA 
swap rates, are good candidates.  
The money market data used in the remainder of this section for the euro area is the one-month 
and the two-week EONIA swap rate from 1 January 1999 to 7 June 2002. Following Gaspar, 
Quiros and Sicilia (2001), we consider that the short-term market rate can be seen as a linear 
combination (b, 1-b) of two events, a decision not to change interest rates from their prevailing 
level (i0) or to change them by 25 basis points (i25).  
025 )1( iiit bb -+=        (1) 
b can thus be interpreted as the probability of at least a 25 basis point change (positive when the 
expectation is of an increase and negative otherwise), against the alternative of not changing the 
key rate.13 At these maturities there seems to be no need to control for the risk premia, as it is 
estimated to be zero.14 However, to take account of the “natural” spread between the market rate 
and the MRO rate (which is a collateralised rate with lower credit risk than the interbank market 
rate), we apply a spread of 5 basis points (bp) between the market rate and the MRO rates.15  
We impose a (rather arbitrary) benchmark for ß to assess the extent to which the market has 
predicted the monetary policy decisions taken by the ECB. We assume that if ß is above 12.5 bp 
in absolute value, which corresponds to a probability of 50% attached to a change of 25 bp in the 
key rates, the market expected the ECB to change its key interest rates.  
We calculate ß for each meeting of the Governing Council using the two-week and one-month 
EONIA swap money market rates one day before the meeting.  We then evaluate the percentage 
of times in which financial markets have anticipated the monetary policy decisions of the ECB. 
                                                           
12  The EONIA is an overnight index average rate (see Annex 1).  
13  The ECB considers as key ECB interest rates the MRO rate (the fixed rate under fixed rate tenders and the 
minimum bid rate under variable rate tenders) and both the marginal and lending facility rates. For the sake of 
clarity, in the remainder of the paper we use MRO rate or key rate interchangeably. 
14  It cannot be rejected that the risk premia is significantly different from zero in the short-term interest rates in the 
EONIA swap market. See Durre, Evjen and Pilegaard (2002) for a thorough analysis on estimates for the risk 
premia across the maturity spectrum for the euro area EONIA swaps. 
15  Alternative estimations applying a natural spread of 3 and 7 basis point yield similar results. 
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Similar to the graphic analysis in Robertson and Thornton (1997) and Ross (2002), Figures 1 and 
2 show the results for all the meetings of the Governing Council.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The monetary policy decisions of the ECB have been accurately predicted 87% (94%) of the 
times when the one-month rate (two-week rate) is used to assess the expectations of market 
participants. The two-week rate is better than the one-month rate for assessing the predictability 
of the monetary policy decisions in the euro area before November 2001, when the ECB 
discussed monetary policy decisions bimonthly. Given that it then switched to monetary policy 
discussions once a month, it is probably more accurate to use since then the one-month rate. In 
any case, the results since November 2001 are similar using both rates. 
The decisions are analysed in more detail in Table 1. Using the two-week rate, the market has 
anticipated with a similar probability the decisions to change interest rates (92%) and to maintain 
them unchanged (94%). On the slightly more negative side, the reliability of changes, defined as 
the percentage of times in which the model signals a rate change and it actually happens, has 
been 80%. Given the frequent meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB before November 
2001, the markets may have found some difficulties anticipating the decision on a particular day. 
Figure 1 shows how the majority of occasions in which a monetary policy decision was expected 
and did not occur are mostly concentrated on the meetings shortly before the ones in which the 
actual change was implemented. While it may be considered that the decision to switch to 
monthly discussions of monetary policy may have affected for the better the predictability of the 
monetary policy decisions of the ECB, it is too soon to tell.  
[Insert Table1 about here] 
The results fall short of the "perfect predictability" benchmark. As already noted, this may 
however be too an extreme benchmark by which to judge a central bank. To see to what extent 
this result is comparable with other similar central banks we apply the same analysis to the 
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monetary policy decisions in the United States, using the one-month Libor dollar rate in a sample 
spanning from 4 January 1999 to 6 June 2002. 16 17 
Figure 3 (and also Table 1) presents the results for the Fed. As can be seen, the similarities are 
large. The percentage of times in which the decisions were anticipated was 90%. While the 
number of changes anticipated is lower than for the ECB (81%), the Fed changed rates on a 
larger number of occasions than the ECB. The percentage of hits for the cuts (82%) and increases 
(100%) in interest rates implemented are also similar. The main difference is that, in the sample, 
markets have never anticipated a change that the Fed failed to deliver and thereby the high score 
in the reliability of changes (100%). This could be due to the fewer meetings held by the FOMC 
in the sample, or perhaps to the fact that markets may have had better guidance, e.g. through 
speeches. Moreover, there are many more announcements of changes than times when the FOMC 
decided to keep the Fed Fund rate unchanged. As Figure 3 shows, on two of the three occasions 
in which the markets failed to anticipate a move from the Fed in the sample, interest rates were 
changed at unscheduled meetings. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
To sum up, using a very simple approach to assess the predictability one day before the monetary 
policy meetings, we find that the monetary policy decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB 
have been very predictable. These results are broadly comparable to the ones obtained for the 
United States Federal Reserve. 
 
3. Monetary policy shocks, surprises and monetary policy decisions of the ECB. 
3.1. What do we mean by monetary policy shocks? 
                                                           
16  While the results cannot be completely comparable as the operational framework in which the two central banks 
operate are different, the use of the one-month rate to measure the predictability of the monetary policy decisions 
of the Fed minimise the lack of comparability, as the FOMC hold scheduled meetings approximately every six 
weeks. Yet, some important caveats need to be considered. The FOMC met on fewer occasions than the Governing 
Council of the ECB in that period, so the market had fewer opportunities to bet on the outcome of a meeting. In 
addition, three monetary policy decisions in the sample were taken at scheduled meetings (3 January, 18 April, and 
17 September 2001), for only one for the ECB. While the model could have been applied to a longer sample for the 
US, we would rather not draw comparisons from different samples. 
17  An estimation or it,t+1 = a + b*Et-1 (it,t+1) + et , where it,t+1 is the one-month dollar Libor rate at time t and Et-1 (it,t+1) 
is the expected one month rate for at time t calculated at t-1, which are cointegrated variables, yielded a risk premia 
of 13 basis points with a standard deviation of 4.4 basis points. Differing from the calculations carried for the euro 
area, the risk premia is significantly different form zero. 
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Market rates summarise the vast amount of information used by the central bank to reach the 
monetary policy decisions. In fact, these rates change as a reaction to the information that arrives 
to the market. 18 In this section, we define the daily changes of a set of short-term interest rates as 
monetary policy shocks. These daily changes, if devoid of liquidity considerations, are almost 
ideal measures of how unexpected news changes market’s expectations of future monetary policy 
decisions during the maturity of the interest rate considered. On the days of monetary policy 
meetings, these shocks reflect the surprise associated with the monetary policy decision. Very 
short-term interest rates (from instruments which mature before the next meeting of the central 
bank) will reflect the short-term surprises of the monetary policy decision, that is if the decision 
was expected to take place at that precise meeting. Daily changes in other longer-term money 
market rates (from instruments which mature only after the next meeting of the central bank) 
allow for analysis if the surprise has also changed the short-term expected path of monetary 
policy rates.  
This definition of monetary policy shocks is not new in the literature. Roley and Sellon (1998) 
Kuttner (2001), Poole and Raasche (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) have used the daily 
change in some money market interest rates as a measure of the monetary policy shocks (the 
surprise or unexpected component of the monetary policy decision). 19 Most of the previous 
papers, however, define the monetary policy shocks as daily changes in market rates on the days 
in which the central bank took a monetary policy decision (and only as a previous step to 
analysing the impact of these shocks on the yield curve). In our view, defining the shocks on a 
daily basis, rather than only on monetary policy meeting days makes sense, as it permits the 
comparison of the shocks on the days of the meetings to other news or events that have affected 
the perspective of future monetary policy decisions. It allows the quantifying of the normal noise 
in the market due to monetary policy or any other kind of news other than the decisions of the 
monetary authority. 
Besides extending the definition of shocks to daily changes in market interest rates, what is new 
in this paper is the way we calculate monetary policy shocks in the euro area. The institutional 
framework matters a lot in the analysis of what the changes in money market rates mean. While 
                                                           
18  Daily changes in risk premium can be considered very low at these short horizons. In any case, the risk premia in 
the euro area is estimated not to be significantly different from zero. See footnote number 14. 
19  Favero et al (1998) define the movement in the overnight rate as policy shocks and define monetary policy 
surprises as the difference between observed overnight rates and expected overnight rates. 
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in the United States there is a strong consensus in the literature that the Fed Fund rates should be 
used to assess expectations20, it is not easy to find such a consensus in the euro area. 
 
3.2.  Monetary policy shocks in the euro area: which rates could we use? 
Every interest rate may have its own advantages and disadvantages. Using daily changes in 
EONIA, for example, provides a measure of shocks highly influenced by liquidity issues, rather 
than (solely) by monetary policy considerations. EONIA swap rates (which span out to one year) 
might be a better alternative as they are not as affected as the EONIA by liquidity issues, 
especially for maturities larger than two weeks. However, they are not completely free of the 
characteristics of the specific operational framework. 
Let us take a (rather) extreme example to clarify this. Assume that we use the two-week EONIA 
rate to gauge market expectations. If at the beginning of a maintenance period  market 
participants receive a piece of news that changes the expectation of interest rates movements by 
the ECB only for a meeting taking place in the next maintenance period, the two week rate may 
not change at all. If, however, this same event occurs less than two weeks before the end of a 
maintenance period, the effect will be partially covered by the two-week rate, and the more so as 
the end of the maintenance period approaches.21 All this suggests that, to the extent that this type 
of effects exists, by measuring shocks with the short-term money market rates we could be 
underestimating the monetary policy shock if the shock occurs that day. In addition, we may also 
be measuring as a shock the impact of information that became available at the beginning of the 
maintenance period. 
While longer-term money market rates provide a picture of how the market view the path of key 
ECB interest rates, they might not be devoid of these specific problems either. Take the monthly 
rate. While its changes are clearly more related to monetary policy expectations over longer 
horizons, some liquidity considerations, such as the end-of-month and end-of-year effects may 
also matter. Other long-term instruments, such as EURIBOR future contracts, while they are not 
affected by these considerations and form a very deep market, may have other problems. As the 
                                                           
20  See Thornton (1995). The fact that the US monetary policy implementation implies daily open market operations 
allows the Fed Funds rate to have more information about market expectations than the information contained in 
the EONIA where weekly and monthly patterns exist due to bank’s liquidity management considerations. For a 
recent comparison on the appropriateness of the different rates to measure expectations of monetary policy, see 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002). 
21  The behaviour of daily rates in the maintenance period is explained in Perez Quiros and Rodriguez (2001). 
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contracts apply to a fixed period of time, the maturity of the instrument changes as times passes, 
which does not happen with EONIA swap rates.  
All in all, there are reasons to use an array of interest rate data to measure the monetary policy 
shocks in the euro area. 
Obviously, there is a wide pool of rates from which we can extract the information. Before that 
decision, however, we should test if, on average, all the variables contain the same amount of 
information, abstracting from the impact of liquidity considerations in very short-term money 
market rates. It is of particular interest to test if implicit or forward rates and the actual realisation 
of rates present a long-term relation showing a stable behaviour of the spreads. If this were the 
case, mixing information from implicit rates and actual rates would be appropriate to solve the 
problem of “contamination” of the information that comes from different liquidity considerations.  
The best way of testing for the long-term relation between actual and implicit rates is to check if 
these variables present a unit root but that a linear combination between the actual and the 
implicit rates are stationary, i.e. a cointegration relation exists between them. In particular we 
check for cointegration in the following set up: 
it =  a + bj * Et-j (it) + ejt+k    (2) 
where it is the one month interest rate, and Et-j (it) represent the one-month rate in one, two and 
three months as indicated by the value of j=1,2,3. 
In all cases, for both, the euro area and the US, the series show cointegration and the bj can be 
accepted to be equal to one. In this set up, the ejt+k represent, not only the spread but also the 
shock to the information set in t-1. 
It seems that there is a long-term equilibrium (markets do not make mistakes on average) and that 
deviations from this equilibrium are stationary.  We can therefore widen our set of money market 
interest rate rates and combine them in order to achieve a better specification for the monetary 
policy shocks. 22 
 
3.3. Monetary policy shocks in the euro area: applying principal components (PC) 
                                                           
22  While an approach using this line has been proposed in the literature to measure predictability over long-horizons, 
and our analysis show that overall the decisions have been predicted on average up to three-months in advance, it 
has the problem that the information set is not the same. While the expectations are calculated with the set of 
information at t-j (for j=1, 2, and 3 months), the actual realisation of the one-month rate uses information up to t. 
Results are available upon request. 
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We propose to use the daily changes of several money market interest rates and add them up 
daily. However, instead of assigning ad hoc weighs to each of the interest rates used, we let the 
data speak by extracting their principal component, without doing any type of intervention in the 
series. The objective is to capture the main common component that shapes the evolution in all 
these rates. The particular considerations that might affect only one series (and that should not be 
related to monetary policy considerations) would in the majority of cases not play an important 
role in the series obtained through the principal component. 
We are also interested in measuring shocks with rates of different maturities. Daily changes in 
longer-term interest rates will reflect better how the expected short-term path of official interest 
rates changes. For example, if after a monetary policy decision of the ECB market participants 
are only surprised by the timing, say because they expected the change a fortnight after, longer-
term interest rates might not change much. However, we do not want to use very long money 
market rates, as their liquidity, and therefore their information content diminishes progressively. 
23 
We use daily changes in the EONIA, changes in the EONIA-swap with maturities of 2 weeks, 
one, two and three-months, and the change in the closest three-month EURIBOR futures. 24 We 
define different measures of monetary policy shocks using principal components (PCj), according 
to the maturities of the interest rates. PCall is calculated applying principal components to the 
daily changes of all the above mentioned money market rates. PCshort uses the market 
instruments up to and including the one-month rate (EONIA, the two-week and the one-month 
rate).  PClong uses the two and three-month EONIA swap rate and the three-month EURIBOR 
future. Finally, PCnoe is PCall without the EONIA rate, which is very volatile and could affect 
the results.25 While we would expect that PCshort could still be influenced by liquidity 
considerations (due to the weight of EONIA), we would expect that the other definition of shocks 
to be devoid of liquidity considerations. 
 
3.4.  An analysis of the monetary policy shocks and the monetary policy decisions of the 
ECB (and the US Federal Reserve) 
                                                           
23  See ECB (2001a). 
24  Annex 1 presents a detailed description of all the interest rates used in the paper. We did not use longer-term rates, 
as those rates might reflect other considerations different other than the expectations of monetary policy. 
25  Annex 2 analyses in detail the principal component technique used and the calculated weights for each definition of 
shock. 
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We now have daily series of monetary policy shocks for the euro area in which the shocks 
generated by the monetary policy decisions of the ECB are only observations of that series. These 
daily shocks (at different maturities) provide a benchmark with which we can compare the 
monetary policy announcements of the ECB. We define a monetary policy surprise as a shock 
bigger than two times its standard deviation.  
Of the 78 meetings of the Governing Council (in a sample of 878 observations) only between 7 
and 10 (depending on the definition of the shock used) were surprises. 26 That is, only between 
18-24% of the surprises in the sample have been caused by monetary policy decisions of the ECB 
(including decisions to change rates and to keep them unchanged). That is, other pieces of 
information have an important affect on the expected path of key interest rates. Of all the 
meetings of the Governing Council the markets have not been surprised in 87% of them (using 
the shocks measured by PCshort). The percentage increases slightly to 90-91% when the other 
measures of shocks are used. These results, together with the meetings of the Governing Council 
of the ECB in which a surprise occurred (according to the four measures of shocks), are 
presented on Table 2. Table 3 in turn lists the shocks on the other days of the sample, and points 
to possible determinants. 
[Insert Tables 2, 3a-3b about here] 
In turn, Figure 4 plots for all the monetary policy meetings of the ECB the changes in the key 
ECB rates and the monetary policy shocks on those days. 
[Insert Figure 4a-4d about here] 
By definition, these shocks capture the surprise associated with the timing of the monetary policy 
decisions.  In fact, it is easy to see why this holds. For every shock, we can define the expected 
change in the key ECB rates one day before the meeting as 
Et-1(Akt) = Akt - PCt      (3) 
where k is the level of the MRO or key interest rate.  
As a major difference to the approach taken in Section 2, the size of the changes in the key ECB 
interest rates now matters. For example, if the market expects a cut in key ECB rates of 50 basis 
points and rates are only lowered by 25 basis points, the shock would adjust by some 25 basis 
                                                           
26  The total number of surprises oscillated between 32 and 55, depending on the shock (see Table 2). 
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points 27. In fact, Figure 4 shows how some of the changes of 50 basis points that were not 
considered surprises in the analysis conducted in Section 1, now appear as surprises.  
This same analysis can be applied to the United States Federal Reserve. Following Poole and 
Raasche (2001), we use the change in the one-month-ahead federal fund future rate as our 
measure of shocks (PR from now on). 28 We also use the two-month-ahead change in the Fed 
fund future (PR1) as a shock, to see if the results are sensitive to the horizon (its maturity ranges 
between 2 and 3 months, while PR spans only between 1 and 2 months depending on the day of 
the month). 
For the 877 observations in the sample, and the 30 meetings of the Fed in that period 29 only 8 of 
the surprises (both according to the measure of PR and PR1) were on days in which the FOMC 
met. That is, only between 22-23% of the surprises in the sample (again, defined as 2 times the 
standard deviation of each series) have stemmed from the meetings of the FOMC, a similar ratio 
to the one obtained for the euro area. However, given the lower number of meetings, the 
percentage of times in which the market has not been surprised by the monetary policy decisions 
is 73%. Table 4 shows these and also lists the meetings of the FOMC in which a surprise was 
estimated to have occurred (according to the two measures of the shocks which provide very 
similar results). Similar to the euro area, an indicative (and non-comprehensive) table which lists 
all the shocks and the events which happened those days is provided in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 4 and Tables 5a-5b about here] 
Figure 5 plots for all the meetings of the FOMC the change in the Fed Funds rate and the 
corresponding shock PR on that day (the results with PR1 are very similar).  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Overall, this section has shown that using a more demanding measure of the predictability of the 
monetary policy decisions of a central bank, the markets have not been surprised on 87-91% of 
the monetary policy meetings of the ECB, a result which is slightly better than for the FOMC.  
                                                           
27  Care needs to be taken when interpreting these results as the shocks are constructed with rates that span more than 
one meeting. These expected rates, however, are good signals of the monetary policy expectations. Annex 3 
exploits these series of expected rates to show, estimating a Probit, that this is a good measure of expectations of 
changes in the key ECB interest rates. 
28  Poole, Raasche and Thornton (2002) show that this measure of shock is broadly similar to the measure used by 
Kuttner (2001), that uses the change in the Fed Fund rate of the current month. 
29  There is no need to take out the meeting on 29 December 2001, as our measure of shock is not affected by the end-
of-year effect. 
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4. Has the daily pattern of the variance of these shocks changed with the announcements 
of monetary policy? 
In this section we analyse to what extent the volatility pattern of the series of shocks change on 
the days of the meetings. This is a good measure of how the monetary policy decisions have 
surprised the markets. Tables 3a-3b (5a-5b) list all the surprises in the euro area (in the United 
States) in the sample. The last column indicates the pieces of news that were cited from market 
sources (Bloomberg) to be the major movers that day. As already analysed in the previous 
sections, besides the monetary policy meetings, the information that arrives to the market on a 
daily basis changes the expected path of monetary policy rates. After an examination of the list, 
the natural variables to check seem to be related to releases of money data, inflation and leading 
indicators for activity.  
We use an EGARCH specification for the analysis of the different factors on the volatility. The 
EGARCH model, introduced by Nelson (1991) and widely used in the finance literature allows a 
flexible dynamic specification for the variance that easily solves the nonnegative constraint 
associate with the GARCH models. The estimated model is: 
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where PCj represents the principal component (the change in a set of money market interest 
rates). The rest of the variables are: 
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We can rewrite the volatility equation as: 
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where tX  include the variables in tV and n lags of those and 1l is a vector that includes the k 
coefficients of tV and (k-1)*n coefficients that affect the lags of the dummy variables. We do not 
impose the non-linear restrictions implied by (5) allowing a different transmission of the 
volatility associated to the “special days” but not constraining (as would be the case if we did not 
consider the lagged dummies) that these “special days” transmit the variance in full as if the 
increase or decrease variance associated to a calendar or meeting effect was due to a shock. 
Finally, we test for the optimal value of the number of lags obtaining n=1.  
Looking at Table 6, the results of the different principal components specifications and the 
EONIA confirm that short-term rates are affected by liquidity needs and that this is not true in the 
case of the long term rates. Dummy variables related with periods associated with excess demand 
or supply of liquidity are clearly significant in the volatility equation for the shorter-term shocks 
and not significant for the longer-term shocks. Also, a principal component model that includes 
both short and long term rates seems to also avoid this liquidity problem. This result gives us 
some motivation for the use of the principal component methodology. It allows us to, 
incorporating some information on the short rates, avoid the liquidity problem that could hide 
important volatility movements. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
What are the results that we obtain for the volatility associated to the meeting? To start with from 
all the events tested, the meetings are the main drivers of the volatility of the series. Interestingly, 
economic variables do not seem to play a major role in the pattern of volatility. This could be due 
to the fact that when euro area data comes out, data for individual countries has already been 
published, reducing its information content. While we use CPI and the IFO for Germany (other 
euro area data has been found to be not significant), other country data (in the case of the IFO) 
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and provisional data for inflation for the German Länder (in the case of the CPI) which are 
published in advance of the data incorporated in V might explain this result. 
Second, there is a greater variance on the days of the meetings of the Governing Council 
compared to the days in which no meetings took place. In particular, the variance on the days of 
the meeting is between 1.6 and 2 times bigger on meeting days. As the volatility is higher the 
shorter the horizon, this result could be seen as indicating that the market is less surprised over 
longer horizons after a meeting of the Governing Council. However, as in the previous sections, 
we want to compare these results with the ones obtained for the FOMC to analyse how much that 
volatility is.  
Table 7 compares it with the results of the euro area. As with other measures of predictability, we 
obtain indications that the variance added on days of the meetings of the monetary authority has 
similar values in the United States and the euro area for the sample checked. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The results of this section indicate that the monetary policy decisions of the ECB increase the 
volatility of interest rates, compared to the normal volatility of the series. This increase is similar 
to the one observed to the one associated in the United States to the meetings of the FOMC. At 
the same time, the results seem to indicate that the market is less surprised over longer-term 
measures of shocks. 
  
5. Impact of the shocks on the term structure of interest rates 
As noted in the introduction, several papers have analysed the impact of the monetary policy 
shocks from the days of the monetary policy meetings of the central bank to the yield curve. This 
allows to measuring how the unexpected component of the monetary policy decision is 
transmitted to the term structure of interest rates. Differently from these papers, however, we are 
not only interested in the impact of these monetary policy shocks on the days of the meetings on 
the term structure of interest rates, but also in the impact of these specific shocks compared to the 
shocks on any other day. 
Monetary policy is conventionally viewed as running from short-term interest rates managed by 
central banks to longer-term rates. Abstracting from default risk considerations, the expectation 
theory of the term structure of interest rates implies that (unexpected) monetary policy decisions 
affect the prices of bonds to the extent that they lead investors to revise their expected path of the 
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monetary policy rate. The impact of the surprise change in the key ECB interest rates on longer-
term bond yields will depend on the perception of the persistence of the surprise. According to 
the expectation hypothesis, a surprise change in the key rates that is expected to last for the term 
of the bond will increase the yield on this bond by the same amount. However, if monetary policy 
decisions are perceived to have only a temporary effect, the impact of a change in the key ECB 
interest rates would be smaller the longer the maturity horizon of the bond. 
The expectation hypothesis might not be the only force shaping the move in the term structure. 
Given the commitment of modern central banks to keep inflation low over the medium term, a 
credible monetary policy affects long-term bond yields by anchoring inflation expectations over 
the long run (the Fischer effect). 30 If a central bank is credible, its actions should be seen as 
compatible with the maintenance of price stability over the medium term.  
We can see the movement in the term structure of interest rates as the net effect of two forces, the 
expectation theory and the Fisher effect. The impact of a monetary policy decision on the term 
structure depends on the impact of such a decision on the future path of short-term interest rates 
and on the expected effect of the monetary policy decision on expected inflation over long 
horizons. The former effect is likely to dominate the short-to-medium term of the yield curve, 
while the latter is likely to dominate the medium to long-end of the term structure. 
 
5.1. Monetary policy shocks and the yield curve  
An extensive stream of the literature has measured the impact of monetary policy decisions on 
the yield curve. An early work of Cook and Hahn (1989) examined the one-day response of bond 
rates in the United States to changes in the target Fed Funds rate from 1974 to 1979.31 They 
regressed the change in the Treasury Bill and several bond rates (DRi, where i stands for the 
maturity of the bond) on the change in the target Fed funds rate (target rate or key rate, Dk). The 
sample consists only of the days in which the Fed changed the Fed Funds target rate. 
ittiiit kR eba +D+=D      (6) 
                                                           
30  The primary objective of the monetary policy of the ECB is the maintenance of price stability over the medium 
term. Price stability is, in turn, defined, as “year-on-year increases of the HICP of below 2%”.  
31  An updated estimation of the approach of Cook and Hahn (1989) is developed in Roley and Sellon (1998) and 
Kuttner (2001). 
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In more recent papers Kuttner (2001), Poole and Raasche (2001) and Poole, Raasche and 
Thornton (2002) have perfected this approach, using the Fed Funds Futures to identify the 
expected and unexpected component of the monetary policy decision (the shock) 32. Once 
identified, they estimate the response of market rates to the expected and unexpected shocks on 
days in which the Fed funds rate was changed. In these studies, the change in the rate of the 
current (Kuttner) or the one-month ahead (PR and PRT) federal funds futures contract after the 
decision is the measure of the unexpected change in the funds rate (PR).33 In turn, the expected 
change in the official monetary policy rates (Et-1(Akt)) is defined as the difference between the 
actual change in the key rate Dkt minus the monetary policy shock, PRt. They then estimate 
ittitiiit kPRR ebba +D++=D )(E 1-t21    (7) 
As in Cook and Hahn (1989), these authors typically find that bond yields respond systematically 
to policy decisions. However, they show that the coefficient on the anticipated component of the 
funds change is generally small and statistically insignificant. In addition, comparing his results 
with estimations a-la Cook and Hahn, Kuttner (2001) indicates that the response of market rates 
to surprise changes in the target is considerably larger than the response to raw changes in target 
rates. These results pinpoint the importance of using monetary policy shocks rather than changes 
in official monetary policy rates to study the response of market rates to a surprise generated by 
the decision to change the official rate.  
With a similar approach, Roley and Sellon (1998) estimate (7) on the days in which the Federal 
Reserve decided to maintain interest rates (with b1i­0 only when the FOMC met and decided to 
maintain the Fed Funds unchanged). They find that there are statistically significant effects of the 
Fed’s decision to maintain interest rates up to the intermediate-end of the yield curve, but beyond 
three years, the effects turn out to be non-significant. Comparing these results with other studies, 
they observe that the response of long-term yields is larger to decisions to change official rates 
than to the decision to maintain them unchanged.  
The purpose of this Section is to analyse how the monetary policy decisions of the ECB (both to 
change and to maintain the key ECB interest rates unchanged) have affected the yield curve in 
the euro area. To do so, we depart slightly from the previous papers and we study the impact of 
                                                           
32  See Favero et al (1996) and Buttiglione et al (1996) for further work on the impact of monetary policy decisions on 
the term structure of interest rates conducted for several countries in Europe, and also for the United States. 
33  See Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Raasche and Thornton (2002) to find a detailed explanation on the definitions of 
these shocks. 
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the unexpected component of the decisions over the official monetary policy rates on the yield 
curve compared to what was the transmission of other monetary policy shocks not related to 
monetary policy decisions. We thus estimate the daily reaction of the yield curve to our (daily) 
measure(s) of monetary policy shocks  (PCj), and we study if the surprises generated on days in 
which the Governing Council met are significantly different to the impact on the yield curve of 
the other daily monetary policy shocks. Failing to do this would prevent the analysis of the 
impact of the shock associated to a monetary policy decision, from a daily shock not generated 
by the decision of the ECB. We estimate: 
i
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where DRi is the change in the 1-year EONIA swap, and the daily change in the 3-year, 5-year 
and 10-year bond yields in the euro area, 34 PCjt the series of monetary policy shocks obtained 
with the principal component analysis in Section 3, Dmeet is a dummy which takes value 1 on days 
of Governing Council meetings and 0 otherwise. Dmove is a dummy with value 1 when key ECB 
rates were changed and 0 otherwise. A dummy distinguishing a rise and a decrease in key rates 
was introduced and found to be not significant due to the lack of observations. The estimations 
were conducted with a lagged operator for the dependent variables. 35 For the parameters to be 
consistently estimated we require that the shocks are true measures of the monetary policy 
shocks, and that there be no contemporaneous policy feedback from the adjustment in the bond 
yields to the monetary policy decisions. This restriction is satisfied as daily movements in long 
term bonds do not impact the monetary policy decisions on that day. 
As a quick guide to interpreting the results, the estimate of the impact of the shocks on the days 
of the meetings (or announcements) should be close to 1 if market participants revise 
permanently (during the life of the bond) their expectation for the key rates. It should be less than 
1 if market participants believe that the change will last for a period that is shorter than the 
maturity of the instrument. It could also be greater than 1 if market participants believe that the 
shock may lead to further (permanent) changes in the same direction. In turn, if the market 
                                                           
34  See Annex 1 for a description the data used. 
35  Lagged values of the independent variables were also used, although the estimated results did not change 
significantly. 
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correctly anticipated the change but missed the timing the size of the response would hinge on 
how big the surprise was. 36  
The estimations are presented for PCnoe (the results using PCall are similar) and PClong. The 
results for PCshort were not significant, although the sign and sizes of the effects were similar to 
the other measures of shocks. This could be interpreted as if the surprises on the timing did not 
have any impact on the yield curve in the euro area. However, it could also be related to the 
higher importance of EONIA in PCshort (which in turn makes that the estimated value of ß is 
low). As movements in rates due to liquidity considerations should not translate to the yield 
curve, this result might not be too surprising. Table 8a presents the estimation of (5)  using 
PCnoe. 
 [Insert Table 8a about here] 
The results need to be interpreted carefully. The impact of monetary shocks on the yield curve is 
significant, albeit lower the longer the yield, as the expectation theory would suggest. On 
average, around 80% of the shocks not related to the meetings is transmitted to the 1 year rate, 
while 70%, 63% and 43% are transmitted to the 3, 5 and 10 year bond yield respectively.  
The dummy for the meetings of the Governing Council is significantly negative for all maturities, 
smoothing out on average the effects of the impact of other shocks on the yield curve. A 
monetary policy shock caused on the days of the Governing Council meetings is around 30% less 
than any other monetary policy shock. A similar result applies for the dummies capturing the 12 
occasions in which the key rates were changed (Dmove). Overall, an unexpected surprise 
associated to the meeting of 100 basis points would typically increase by 59, 37, 31, and 14 basis 
points the 1, 3, 5 and 10-year yield respectively. 37 In other words, the shocks caused by the 
meetings of the Governing Council have a lower impact on the yield curve than the impact of 
other monetary policy shocks. In turn, a surprise change in rates of 100 basis points would on 
average have an impact of 54, 28, 23 and 7 basis points on 1, 3, 5 and 10-year yield respectively. 
38 
                                                           
36  As already argued, over longer-term horizons, given the lags with which monetary policy operates, one should also 
see the Fisher affecting interest rates. 
37  These results are common to other similar studies for the US (see Poole, Raasche and Thornton (2002), Kuttner 
(2001)). Cochrane and Piazessi (2002), estimate higher impacts for K. 
38  Given that the days of the meetings are days where the average shock was higher, it could be argued this smoothing 
of the meetings is not more than the normal smoothing of a large shock in the money market. To test whether this 
is true, we have estimated (8) with dummies on the days in which the (12) largest shocks different from shocks at 
meetings occurred. The impact of these large shocks on the yield curve was found to be not significant. 
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Table 8b presents the results for PClong. Overall, the impact of the monetary policy shocks and 
the effects of the meetings are slightly larger. This could be due to the fact that the maturity (the 
duration) of the instruments used to calculate PClong are larger than in PCnoe. 
[Insert Table 8b about here] 
 
5.2. Monetary policy shocks and the implicit interest rates at long horizons 
The shocks generated on the days of the meeting of the Governing Council do have an impact on 
the yield curve, although smaller than the impact of a monetary policy shock on any other day. It 
is however difficult to disentangle from the previous analysis to what extent the Fisher effect 
holds, and whether it compensates or not for the expectation theory effect. 
In the main, the answer boils down to obtaining an interpretation of the impact of these shocks on 
the term structure. This can be facilitated by the study of the impact of the shocks on the implicit 
yields, a more accurate representation of the term structure. Haldane and Read  (1999) try to fill 
this gap between the theory and the applied work through a model where the transmission 
mechanism, a reaction function of monetary policy authorities and the (market’s) expectation 
theory are present. In this framework, the agents face two types of uncertainties, the uncertainty 
about the central bank’s (interpretation of) economic indicators and uncertainty about their policy 
objectives. Solving the model, they find that the interest rate surprise is a combination of two 
components, the (market’s) uncertainty about the central bank’s interpretation of the economy 
and the uncertainty on the monetary policy objective. In short, due to the monetary transmission 
lags, the latter has no impact on short-maturity forward rates, while the reverse is true at long 
maturities. Shocks on the long end of the implicit curve could thus be interpreted as uncertainty 
as regards the objective of the central bank. Through a numerical example on their model for 
plausible values of the parameters, they find that the credibility effect dominates over the longer 
part of the sample. We therefore estimate as in (5) 
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where Dri is now the change in the implicit rates39. The rest of variables are like in equation (8). 
We only report the results obtained using PCnoe. 
The first thing to report is that lagged variables of the shocks matter in (6). Table 9a reports the 
estimates for equation (6). The low end of the table reports both the impact of the meetings if we 
were only to consider the contemporaneous effects, and the overall impact, taking care of all the 
lagged variables (one lag).  
[Insert Table 9a about here] 
Daily monetary policy shocks have a significant impact up to the fifth-year implicit rate (the one-
year rate in four years). The impact on the days of the meeting of the Governing Council is 
however lower. The longer two-year implicit rates show that both the impact of the shocks and of 
the meetings (this one only for the ninth year) are also significant. It might however be more 
intuitive to use averages of the implicit rates for the medium and the long end of the curve. To 
this end, we define a series named “medium” which is the average of the one year rate expected 
by the market at day t to prevail 4, 5 and 6 years ahead, a horizon from which the expectation 
theory effect should no longer be relevant. The series named “long” is an average of the longer 
implicit rates (one-year rate in 7, 8 and 9 years). The estimated results are shown in Table 9b. 
[Insert Table 9b about here] 
For Ari = “medium” we find that the impact of the shock (PCnoe) is significant and positive. 29 
bp of a monetary policy shock is transmitted to the medium section of the term structure. The 
impact is however much lower for meeting days (8 bp) and on meetings in which the key rates 
are changed (3 bp). The impact of the lagged shocks is not significant. 
Important things happen on the long end of the term structure of interest rates. Of a shock of 100 
bp, 23 bp impact the longer implicit rates, although this impact is almost totally reversed one day 
afterwards (and the overall effect drops to 4bp). This indicates that the market does not typically 
expect an increase in inflation over longer horizons on account of monetary policy shocks. As 
regards the shocks generated by the meetings of the Governing Council, the bottom of Table 9b 
shows that the impact on the yield curve of a change of 100 bp changes the long-term implicit 
rates by 1 bp and turns negative when one lag of the dependent variable is used. That is, a 
positive shock typically reduces long term implicit rates while a negative shock tends to increase 
                                                           
39  The rates are taken from an estimation of the term structure of interest rates using daily data of the one-year 
EONIA swap and the interest rate swaps spanning from 2 to 10 years. The estimation is done with the 
bootstrapping technique. 
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them. These results indicate that a surprise increase in official rates reduce the expectation for 
inflation over the medium term, while a surprise reduction in official rates typically increases it. 
The lack of significance of dummies capturing increases and decreases in rates prevents us from 
reaching further conclusions. 
The fact that the impact of monetary policy decisions on long term implicit rates is of limited size 
(and negative) has been seen in other papers as pointing to a credible monetary policy. A 
previous paper, Buttiglioni et al (1998), claims that this reaction of market rates is indicative of 
credible (or “text-book”) central banks, as inflation expectations typically tend to decrease when 
monetary policy is tightened and to increase when it is eased. In fact, the results obtained here for 
the euro area match those obtained in that study for Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. This 
could provide evidence that the ECB has maintained the credibility that some of the most 
credible central banks in the European Union countries had prior to the Monetary Union. 
Overall, in this section we find evidence that the impact of the monetary policy shocks on bond 
yields declines with the maturity of the bond, as the expectation hypothesis would suggest. In 
addition, we show that the impact on the yield curve of a given monetary policy shock is 
significantly lower when that shock comes from a meeting of the Governing Council. Using 
implicit rates instead of bond yields, a better measure of the term structure, we find evidence that 
the market views the ECB as credible. 
 
6. Conclusions 
It is often argued that a central bank should lead financial markets by signalling its intentions, 
more than surprising with its decisions, as monetary policy can be more effective when financial 
markets understand how the central bank assesses economic developments in relation to the 
policy objectives, and anticipates its decisions. If the market knew perfectly how the monetary 
authority filtered every piece of information relevant for the conduct of monetary policy, 
monetary policy decisions would be predictable. That is, the decisions on interest rates of a 
central bank should provide no significant information to market participants and should trigger 
little reactions in financial markets. A necessary condition for this to happen is a high level of 
transparency on the side of the central bank. 
This paper has first examined the predictability of the monetary policy of the ECB and has 
analysed the impact of monetary policy decisions on the yield curve.  
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As regards predictability, we have provided evidence, using a battery of tests that the markets 
have not been overall surprised by the monetary policy decisions of the ECB, that is that markets 
have been able to predict the Governing Council’s decisions on key ECB interest rates fairly 
accurately. While the benchmark of perfect predictability is not reached, similar results are 
obtained for the Federal Reserve, a central bank with a long track record of transparency and 
credibility. This is to be seen as proof that despite its youth, the ECB has been as predictable as 
the Federal Reserve throughout the period analysed.  
As regards the transmission of the (unexpected component of the) monetary policy decisions to 
the yield curve, we provide evidence that the meetings smooth out the impact of the monetary 
policy shocks (daily changes in short-term interest rates) generated outside meeting days. We 
also find that the impact of the monetary policy shocks outside meeting days on the longer 
section of the implicit yield curve is significant, although it weakens significantly the next day. 
This could be evidence pointing to the markets belief that inflation will be stable in the long run, 
as the daily shocks do not have an impact on longer-term yields. As regards the impact of the 
shocks generated on the days of the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB, we find 
evidence showing that the impact is limited. This could provide evidence that the ECB has 
maintained the credibility that some of the most credible central banks in the European Union 
countries had prior to the Monetary Union. 
 33
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, M., H. Dillén and P. Sellin, 2001, Monetary policy signalling and movements in the 
Swedish term structure of interest rates, Sveriges Riksbank, Woking Paper No 132. 
Bindseil, U., 2002, Equilibrium bidding in the Eurosystem’s open market operations, ECB 
Working Paper No 137. 
Bernhardsen, T  and A. Kloster, 2002, Transparency and predictability in Monetary policy, 
Economic Bulletin Q2, Norges Central Bank.  
Bomfim, A., V. Reinhart, 2000, Making news: financial market effects of Federal Reserve 
disclosure practices, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series, No 2000-14. 
Brooke, M., N. Cooper and C. Scholtes, 2000, Inferring market interest rate expectations from 
money market rates, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, November. 
Buttiglione Del Giovane and Tristani, 1998, Monetary Policy Actions and the Term Structure 
of Interest Rates: A Cross-Country Analysis; in Monetary policy and interest rates, edited by 
Angeloni and Rovelli (1998), McMillan Press. 
Campell, J.Y. 1995, Some lessons from the yield curve, NBER Working Paper No 5031 
Clare, A. and R. Courtenay, 2001, What can we learn about monetary policy transparency from 
financial market data?, Discussion paper 06/01, Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Cochrane, J. H., M. Piazzesi, 2002, The Fed and interest rates: a high-frequency identification, 
NBER, Working Paper 8839, also in Asset prices and monetary policy, AEA papers and 
proceedings, May 2002. 
Cook, T. and T. Hahn, 1989, The effect of changes in the Federal Funds rate on market interest 
rates in the 1970s, Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 33-51. 
Cuikerman, A., 2000, Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and 
objectives and what difference does it make?, CFS/Bundesbank conference on “Transparency in 
Monetary Policy”. 
Demiralp, S., 2001, Monetary Policy in a Changing World: Rising Role of Expectations and the 
Anticipation Effect, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Discussion Paper. 
Demiralp, S. and O. Jorda, 2002 The Announcement effect: Evidence from Open Market Desk 
data, Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Demiralp, S. and O. Jorda, 2000, The Pavlovian Response of Term Rates to Fed 
Announcements, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economic 
Discussion Series No 2001-10. 
Demiralp, S. and O. Jorda, 2002, The response of Term rates to Fed announcements, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 2002. 
Durre, Evjen, Pilegaard, 2002, Estimating risk premia in money market rates, mimeo. 
ECB, 2001a, The euro money market, July  
ECB, 2001b, The euro bond market, July  
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002, How transparent are central banks?, unpublished paper. 
 34
Faust, J, E. Swanson and J. Wright, 2002, Identifying Vars based on high frequency futures 
data, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussions 
papers. 
Favero, C. and F. Iacone and M. Pifferi, 1998, Monetary Policy, Forward Rates and Long 
Rates: Does Germany Differ from the United States?, Monetary policy and interest rates, edited 
by Angeloni and Rovelli, McMillan Press. 
Gaspar, V.,G. Perez-Quiros and J. Sicilia, 2001, The ECB monetary policy strategy and the 
money market, International Journal of Finance and Economics 6, 325-342. 
Gerbach, H. and V. Hahn, 2002, Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank 
councils, unpublished, May.  
Goodfriend , M., 1986, Monetary Mystique: secrecy and central banking”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 17, 63-92. 
Goodfriend , M., 1998, Using the Term Structure of Interest rtes of monetary policy, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly Vol.84/3 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2002, Market-based measures of Monetary policy 
Expectations, Finance and Economics discussion series, The Federal Reserve Board, August. 
Haldane, A. and V. Read, 2000, Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve, Working Paper, 
Bank of England.  
Hämäläinen, S., 2001, The ECB´s monetary policy, accountability, transparency and 
communication, Old Age, New Economy and Central Banking Conference, CEPR/ESI and 
Suomen Pankki. 
Hamilton, James, 1996, The Daily Market for Federal Funds, Journal of Political Economy, 104 
(1): 26-56. 
Hamilton, J. and O. Jorda, 2000, A Model for the Federal Funds Rate Target, NBER working 
paper 7847 
Hardy, D., 1998, Anticipation and surprises in central bank interest rate policy: the case of the 
Bundesbank, IMF working paper No 43 
Hartmann, P., M. Manna and A. Manzanares, 2001, The Microstructure of the Euro Money 
Market, Journal of International Money and Finance,  
Issing, O., V. Gaspar, I. Angeloni and O. Tristani, 2001, Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: 
Strategy and Decision-Making at the European Central Bank, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Issing, O., October 1999, The monetary policy of the ECB: stability, transparency, 
accountability”, speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 
Issing, O., June 2000, Communication challenges for the ECB, CFS research confidence “The 
ECB and its watchers II” 
Issing, O., 2001, Monetary policy and financial markets, ECB watchers conference, 18 June. 
Keith, S., January/February 1996, The cyclical volatility of interest rates, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, Business Review 
Kessel, R.A., 1965, The cyclical behaviour of the term structure of interest rates, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 91. 
 35
Krueger, J. and K. Kuttner, 1996, The Fed Funds Futures Rate as a Predictor of Federal 
Reserve Policy, Journal of Futures Markets, 16 (8), 865-879. 
Kuttner, K., 2001, Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed Funds 
Futures Markets, Journal of Monetary Economics 47, No 3, 523-44. 
Lange, Sack and Whitesell (2001), Anticipations of monetary policy in financial markets, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April. 
Manna, M., H. Pill and G. Quiros, 2001, The Eurosystem’s Operational Framework in the 
context of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy, European Central Bank, mimeo. 
Martínez Resano, J.R., 1999, Instrumentos derivados de los tipos overnight: call money swaps y 
futuros sobre fondos federales, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España. 
McCallum, B.T., 1999, Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules, in J. Taylor and M. 
Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1c, chapter 23, Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
McCallum, B.T., 2001, Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism, in Deutsche 
Bundesbank (ed.), The Monetary Transmission Process, Palgrave. 
Meltzer, A.H., 1993, Commentary: the Role of Judgement and Discretion in the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Changing Capital Markets: Implications 
for Monetary Policy. 
Mishkin, F.S., 1988, The information in the term structure: some further results, Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, Vol. 3, p. 307-314 
Nelson, D. B. (1991): Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach, 
Econometrica 59 (2): 347-370.  
Perez-Quiros, G. and H. Mendizabal, 2001, The daily market for Funds in Europe: Has 
Something Changed with the EMU?, ECB Working Paper. Number 67. 
Poole, W. and R. Rasche, 2000, Perfecting the Markets Knowledge of Monetary Policy, Journal 
of Financial Services Research, 18, pp. 255-298. 
Poole, W. R. Rasche, and D. L. Thornton, 2001, Market anticipations of monetary policy 
actions, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 26th Annual Economic Policy Conference. 
Roley, V. and G. Sellon, 1998, Market reaction to monetary policy nonannouncements, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Research Working Paper. No. 98-06. 
Roberson, J.C. and D. L. Thornton, December 1997, Using federal funds futures rates to 
predict federal reserve actions, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review  November/December 
1997 
Ross, K. (2002) Market predictability of ECB monetary policy decisions: a comparative analysis, 
in the Monetary and Exchange rate policies of the euro area- Selected Issues (2002), forthcoming. 
Rudebusch, G.D. (1995), Federal Reserve interest rate targeting, rational expectations, and the 
term structure, Journal of Economics 35 p.245-274. 
Rudebusch, G.D., (1998), Do measures of monetary policy in a var make sense?, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, International Economic Review Vol.39,No. 4 p. 907-931 
Rudesbusch, G.D., (2001), Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and the monetary 
policy inertia, forthcoming in Journal of Monetary Economics. 
 36
Santillan, J; M. Bayle and C. Thygesen “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets”, 
ECB Occasional Paper Series, July 2000 
Schich, S. T., 1997, Estimating the German term structure, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion 
Paper 4/97. 
Schich, S.T., 1996, Alternative specifications of the German term structure and its information 
content regarding inflation, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper 8/96. 
Soderlind, P. and L.E.O. Svensson, 1997, “New Techniques to Extract Market Expectations 
from Financial Instruments”. Journal of Monetary Economics; 40(2), October , pages 383-429. 
Taylor. J.B., July 2001, Expectations, Open Market Operations, and  Changes in the Federal 
Funds Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review July/August 2001 
Thornton, D.L., 2001, The bias in the conventional test of the expectations theory: Resolving the 
anomalies at the very short end of the term structure, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Woking 
paper 200-003B. 
Thornton, D.L., 2002, Getting the markets in synch with monetary policy, Proceedings of the 
26th Annual Economic Policy Conference of the Federal Reserva Bakn of St. Louis Review, 84 
(4). 
Ulrich B., April 2002, Equilibrium bidding in the Eurosystem's open market operations, ECB, 
Woking Paper No. 137. 
Winkler, B, 2000, Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-
making ECB Working Paper, No 26.  
Wurtz, F, 2001, An Empirical Model on the Spread Between the Eonia Rate and the Middle of 
the Corridor, mimeo, ECB 
 37
Annex 1. Description of the data 
1. Data for the euro area 
The set of data used spans from 4 January 1999 to 6 June 2002. Some observations had to be 
interpolated due to implausible values (a list of those days still has to be added). The 
characteristics of the series are the following: 
EONIA: It is a measure of the effective interest rate prevailing in the euro interbank overnight 
market. It is calculated as a weighted average of the interest rates on unsecured overnight 
contracts on deposits denominated in euro, as reported by a panel of contributing banks.  
EONIA swap rates: An EONIA swap rate is an agreement between two parties to exchange a set 
of variable daily payments at the EONIA rate with a set of payments at a fixed rate over an 
agreed period of time. The interest rate on the fixed leg of this swap is referred to as the EONIA 
swap rate and it reflects the expected average level of the EONIA over the maturity of the swap. 
EONIA swaps are offered at maturities of one, two and three weeks and from one to twelve 
months. They are traded over the counter (OTC), bilaterally and not at an exchange. The liquidity 
is high at the shortest maturities. The data collected are mid rates (average between bid and ask 
rates) at the end-of-day. The forward rates used in the text (the one-month in one, two and three 
months are derived from EONIA swaps and assuming perfect arbitrage.  
Three-month EURIBOR futures: It is a contract to engage in a three month loan or deposit of a 
set amount, starting on a specific future date. By buying or selling this contract, an investor can 
fix the effective rate for borrowing or lending a set amount of money over a future three-month 
period. At horizons up to 18 months, EURIBOR futures are very liquid and the implied rates are 
likely to reliably reflect the expected future level of the three-month EURIBOR. The data 
collected are mid prices (average between bid and ask prices) at the end-of-day. The contracts 
mature in March, June, September and December. 
Euro area bond yields: Yields on the benchmark bonds of euro-11 countries from January 1999 to 
December 2000 and for euro-12 countries since January 2001 onwards. The data collected are 
mid yields (average between bid and ask yields) at the end-of-day.  
Interest rate swaps: The yield on a swap (maturity i) can be seen as the yield of a par bond with a 
coupon equal to the yield at maturity i. The risk of this instrument is the risk associated to the 
interbank market. 
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Monetary policy shocks 
The series of monetary policy shocks are constructed applying principal components to the series 
of daily changes in several money market rates (see Annex 2). Two peculiarities are worth 
mentioning here however as regards the use of the series. First, the ECB has changed the time at 
which it announced its monetary policy decisions. Until 8 April 1999 the ECB announced the 
decision of the Governing Council at around 18:00 or later, while since 22 April 1999 onwards, 
the decision started to be announced at 13,45. To address this, the dummy that catches the effect 
of the meeting on the money market interest rates is placed one day after the meeting until 8 
April 1999 and the same day of the meeting since 22 April 1999. Second, different money market 
rates incorporate information at different times: while the EONIA rate is a weighted average, and 
therefore incorporates information of what happens in the course of the day, the rest of the data 
incorporates the information available at the end of the day (at around 17,30). To take these two 
issues into account, the change in the money market series that enter the definition of the shocks 
are the following. 
EONIA: The “shock” from the EONIA on day t is measured as EONIAt- EONIAt-1 until 21 April 
and as EONIAt+1- EONIAt since 22 April onwards. 
EONIA swaps: The “shock” from these rates on day t is measured as Rt- Rt-1  
Three-month EURIBOR: The “shock” from these rates on day t is measured as Rt- Rt-1. The 
contract used is always the “next contract”. However, due to the nature of the futures contracts 
we need to merge the data when the contract expires. For the changes in the three-month 
EURIBOR, we use the daily change of the most proximate contract until the first working day of 
the month in which the contract expires (March, June, September and December). As at these 
dates the volume of transaction typically drops, we switch to the next contract (of June, 
September, December of the same year and March of the following year respectively). For 
example, on 1 March 1999 we switch from daily changes in the March future contract to daily 
changes in the June contract. 
2. Data for the United States 
The data used for the United States are the one month Libor dollar (close of business data) and 
the one-month and two-month ahead Fed Fund Futures. Please refer to Kuttner (2001) and Poole, 
Raasche, Thornton (2002) for an analysis of the futures data used. We make the same corrections 
to the series than these authors do. 
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Annex 2. Principal components 
Using principal components can solve the problem of summarising in one variable the 
information context of a set of variables. The question to answer is which is the best linear 
combination of the variables that provides the best fit to explain the movements of all of them?  
We use the following interest rates: daily changes in the EONIA, the EONIA-swaps (with a 
maturity of 2 weeks, one, two and three-months, and the daily change in the closest three-month 
EURIBOR futures. For the changes in the three-month EURIBOR, we use the daily change of the 
most proximate contract. We change to the next contract 15 days before its expiration, a time 
where the volume of transactions typically drops.  
Let us denote by X ),,,,,( 554321 tttttt XXXXXXX =  where all the variables are in 
differences, and   
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We are looking for a (6X1) vector C such that:  XCPCj =  where PCj is the combination that 
best explains (maximises the R-Squared) the behaviour of the individual series. Obviously, 
before doing the analysis, all the series have to be normalised in order to avoid that the most 
volatile series dominate the weight of the estimation.  
The problem to solve in order to calculate the value of the vector C is just a maximisation 
problem subject to the fact that the weights have to add to one. The result in our case is a vector 
),,,,,( 654321 ccccccC =  that will be the characteristic vector associated with the highest 
eigenvalue of X´X.  
We consider that in this case, principal component is a good approach to capture the unobserved 
component that describe the comovements among all these rates because, as a difference to other 
unobserved component techniques (Kalman filter, Markov switching, etc.) the law of motion of 
the unobserved component should not be relevant in the determination of its value and we prefer 
to give more weight to the actual observations of the different rates. 
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In PCj , j stands for the four principal components used (short, long, all, noe).  
The four series of the shocks are homogenised to have the variance of the daily changes in the 
one-month EONIA Swap (0.038 basis points). In particular, the estimated weighs are: 
Cshort=  (0.230, 0.391, 0.379, 0.000, 0.000, 0.000)  
Cnoe=  (0.000, 0.156, 0.213, 0.221, 0.215, 0.195) 
Call=  (0.056, 0.150, 0.201, 0.208, 0.203, 0.183) 
Clong=  (0.000, 0.000, 0.000, 0.326, 0.347, 0.327) 
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Annex 3: estimation of a Probit 
Using an ordered probit model, we test if the expectations of monetary policy changes from 
equation (3), Et-1(Akt) = Akt - PCt is a good measure of the expectations of the market for changed 
in the key ECB interest rates. The range of values to test are the set of responses {up, maintain, 
down}. We define dtmeet=1 if t falls on the day on which the Governing Council of the ECB 
announces a monetary policy decision.  
In addition to assessing their predictive ability, we consider the impact of liquidity (measured by 
dummies capturing end and start-of-maintenance period effects), to see if the shocks are devoid 
of liquidity considerations. We define dtemp=1 if t falls in any of the last three business days of the 
maintenance period, 0 otherwise. dtbmp=1 if t falls in the first business day of the maintenance 
period and 0 otherwise. To check to what extent the liquidity considerations are out of the new 
measure, we also apply this probit to the analyses for the EONIA. 
As in Demiralp and Jorda (2002), we hypothesise the existence of an unobserved latent variable 
st+1 such that 
st+1 = gEt-1(Akt)+ gmdtmeetEt-1(Akt+1)+gedtempEt-1(Akt) +gbdtbmpEt-1(Akt) +ut   
where ut+1 i.i.d. N(0,1). The discrete changes in the target are related to the latent process 
according to: 
Et-1(Akt) = 
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Table A contains the maximum likelihood estimates of this ordered probit model for the EONIA, 
the one month swap rate, Pcshort, Pclong, PCall, and PCnoe. The estimations suggest that the 
days when the Governing Council of the ECB met strengthened the signal provided by Et-1(Akt). 
With respect to the liquidity dummies, as expected, they are only significant in the estimation 
with the EONIA. 
 
[Insert Table A] 
C
en
tr
al
 
b
an
k
In
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
m
at
u
ri
ty
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
ee
ti
n
g
s
O
ve
ra
ll 
h
it
 
ra
te
 (1
)
R
el
ia
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
ch
an
g
es
 (
2)
E
C
B
2-
w
ee
k
(7
8)
94
%
(1
2)
92
%
(6
6)
94
%
(5
)
80
%
(7
)
10
0%
80
%
E
C
B
1 
m
o
n
th
(7
8)
87
%
(1
2)
92
%
(6
6)
86
%
(5
)
80
%
(7
)
10
0%
60
%
F
E
D
1 
m
o
n
th
(2
9)
90
%
(1
6)
81
%
(1
1)
10
0%
(1
1)
82
%
(6
)
10
0%
10
0%
N
ot
e:
 C
al
cu
la
tio
ns
 fo
r 
th
e 
E
C
B
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
on
e-
m
on
th
 a
nd
 th
e 
tw
o-
w
ee
k 
E
O
N
IA
 s
w
ap
 r
at
es
. N
o 
ris
k 
pr
em
iu
m
 a
nd
 a
 n
at
ur
al
 s
pr
ea
d 
of
 5
 b
as
is
 p
oi
nt
s
Th
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 fo
r 
th
e 
Fe
d 
ar
e 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
on
e-
m
on
th
 d
ol
la
r 
Li
bo
r 
ra
te
 w
ith
 a
 r
is
k 
pr
em
iu
m
 o
f 1
3 
ba
si
s 
po
in
ts
 (
se
e 
te
xt
).
Th
e 
m
ee
tin
g 
on
 2
9-
D
ec
-9
9 
in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
is
 ta
ke
n 
ou
t o
f t
he
 s
am
pl
e 
du
e 
to
 im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 e
nd
-o
f-y
ea
r 
ef
fe
ct
.
N
ot
e:
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 n
um
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 c
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
 m
ee
tin
gs
 o
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
(d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
he
ad
er
)
(1
) 
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 c
or
re
ct
 s
ig
na
ls
(2
) 
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 ti
m
e 
th
e 
m
od
el
 s
ig
na
ls
 r
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 o
ne
 a
ct
ua
lly
 h
ap
pe
ns
T
ab
le
 1
: 
P
re
d
ic
ta
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
m
o
n
et
ar
y 
p
o
lic
y 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
o
f 
th
e 
E
C
B
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
F
ed
In
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
ch
an
g
es
In
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
n
o
-c
h
an
g
es
C
u
ts
 
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
In
cr
ea
se
s 
an
ti
ci
p
at
ed
0
25
)
1(
i
i
i t
b
b
-
+
=
42 
P
C
sh
o
rt
 (2
)
P
C
lo
n
g
 (3
)
P
C
al
l
P
C
n
o
e
8-
ab
r-
99
-0
,5
0
-0
,2
3
-0
,2
8
-0
,3
1
-0
,3
2
H
ig
he
r c
ut
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
7-
oc
t-9
9
0,
00
-0
,1
2
-0
,1
0
-0
,1
4
-0
,1
4
A
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d
27
-a
br
-0
0
0,
25
0,
04
0,
08
0,
07
0,
07
In
cr
ea
se
 c
am
e 
as
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
on
ly
 fo
r P
C
lo
ng
8-
ju
n-
00
0,
50
0,
15
0,
26
0,
25
0,
26
H
ig
he
r i
nc
re
as
e 
th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
5-
oc
t-0
0
0,
25
0,
07
0,
07
0,
09
0,
09
In
cr
ea
se
 w
as
 p
ar
tly
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e
4-
en
e-
01
0,
00
-0
,0
3
-0
,1
2
-0
,0
9
-0
,1
0
D
ue
 to
 th
e 
cu
t i
n 
th
e 
F
ed
 F
un
d 
ra
te
s 
on
 3
 J
an
ua
ry
11
-a
br
-0
1
0,
00
0,
12
0,
17
0,
17
0,
16
A
 c
ut
 w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
an
d 
no
t f
ul
fil
le
d
10
-m
ay
-0
1
-0
,2
5
-0
,1
4
-0
,2
2
-0
,2
2
-0
,2
3
T
he
 c
ut
 w
as
 n
ot
 e
xp
ec
te
d
17
-s
ep
-0
1
-0
,5
0
-0
,2
8
-0
,3
0
-0
,3
6
-0
,3
6
C
on
ce
rt
ed
 in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
cu
t. 
U
ns
ch
ed
ul
ed
 m
ee
tin
g.
A
ll 
th
e 
sh
o
ck
s 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
p
le
18
%
24
%
20
%
22
%
T
h
e 
m
ee
tin
g
s 
o
f t
h
e 
E
C
B
 (4
)
87
%
90
%
91
%
91
%
T
o
ta
l n
u
m
b
er
 o
f s
u
rp
ri
se
s 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
p
le
55
34
35
32
(1
): 
In
 b
ol
d 
if 
th
e 
sh
oc
k 
is
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
(d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
la
rg
er
 th
an
 tw
ic
e 
th
e 
no
rm
al
is
ed
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 0
.0
38
 b
p)
(2
): 
D
ue
 to
 ju
m
ps
 in
 E
O
N
IA
 (
an
d 
to
 a
 le
ss
er
 e
xt
en
t i
n 
th
e 
1-
w
ee
k 
ra
te
), 
th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 
   
   
sh
oc
ks
 a
ls
o 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 o
n 
22
 A
pr
il 
19
99
, 2
0 
M
ay
 1
99
9,
 2
3 
S
ep
t 1
99
9 
an
d 
21
 J
un
e 
20
01
(3
): 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
al
so
 o
cc
ur
re
d 
on
 3
 F
eb
-2
00
0 
of
 9
 b
p
(4
): 
O
n 
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
th
e 
sh
oc
k 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
 c
ut
 in
 th
e 
F
ed
 F
un
ds
 ra
te
 a
nd
 n
ot
 to
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 it
se
lf 
of
 th
e 
E
C
B
N
ot
e:
 B
im
on
th
ly
 m
ee
tin
gs
 u
nt
il 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
00
1,
 m
on
th
ly
 m
ee
tin
gs
 (w
he
re
 m
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
is
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
) s
in
ce
 th
en
.
Ta
bl
e 
2:
 M
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
su
rp
ri
se
s 
on
 G
ov
er
ni
ng
 C
ou
nc
il'
s 
m
ee
tin
g 
da
ys
D
at
e 
o
f t
h
e 
m
ee
tin
g
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 k
ey
 E
C
B
 r
at
es
S
h
o
ck
s 
(in
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
p
o
in
ts
) (
1)
C
o
m
m
en
ts
%
 o
f s
ho
ck
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 to
 m
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
f t
he
 E
C
B
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
:
43
P
C
sh
o
rt
 (2
)
P
cl
on
g(
3)
P
C
al
l
P
C
no
e
18
-e
ne
-9
9
N
O
-0
,0
4
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
7
S
pe
ec
h 
P
re
si
de
nt
 a
t t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
P
ar
lia
m
en
t
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
8-
ab
r-
99
N
O
-0
,2
3
-0
,2
8
-0
,3
1
-0
,3
2
H
ig
he
r 
cu
t t
ha
n 
ex
pe
ct
ed
M
ee
tin
g
13
-a
go
-9
9
N
O
-0
,0
1
-0
,1
1
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
8
E
ur
o 
ar
ea
 p
ro
du
ce
r 
pr
ic
es
 
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
1-
oc
t-
99
N
O
0,
07
0,
21
0,
17
0,
19
S
pe
ec
h:
 P
re
si
de
nt
 w
ar
ni
ng
 o
n 
m
on
ey
 a
nd
 Is
si
ng
 o
n 
in
fla
tio
n
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
7-
oc
t-
99
N
O
-0
,1
2
-0
,1
0
-0
,1
4
-0
,1
4
A
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 k
ey
 r
at
es
 e
xp
ec
te
d
M
ee
tin
g
14
-o
ct
-9
9
N
O
0,
02
0,
08
0,
06
0,
07
M
B
 (
in
fla
tio
n 
ris
ks
 r
is
in
g)
 a
nd
 Is
si
ng
 (
st
ro
ng
 g
ro
w
th
)
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
25
-o
ct
-9
9
N
O
0,
06
0,
07
0,
07
0,
06
G
er
m
an
 C
P
I
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
29
-o
ct
-9
9
N
O
0,
05
0,
10
0,
10
0,
11
Is
si
ng
, N
oy
er
 (
ra
te
s 
hi
st
or
ic
al
ly
 lo
w
),
 D
om
in
go
 (
gr
ow
th
)
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
29
-d
ic
-9
9
N
O
-0
,0
3
-0
,0
3
-0
,0
7
-0
,1
3
E
nd
 o
f y
ea
r 
ef
fe
ct
Li
qu
id
ity
27
-e
ne
-0
0
N
O
0,
07
0,
19
0,
15
0,
15
H
IC
P
 (
26
 J
un
e)
 a
nd
 c
om
m
en
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 r
at
es
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
3-
fe
b-
00
N
O
0,
02
-0
,0
9
-0
,0
4
-0
,0
5
R
ea
ss
es
sm
en
t o
n 
in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
M
ee
tin
g
18
-f
eb
-0
0
N
O
0,
03
0,
11
0,
09
0,
09
Is
si
ng
 (
"E
C
B
 w
ill
 r
ea
ct
 o
n 
a 
tim
el
y 
m
an
ne
r"
)
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
10
-m
ar
-0
0
N
O
0,
05
0,
09
0,
09
0,
10
M
ar
ke
t t
al
ks
 a
bo
ut
 h
ig
he
r 
gr
ow
th
M
ar
ke
t
24
-m
ar
-0
0
N
O
0,
02
0,
08
0,
06
0,
06
G
er
m
an
 im
po
rt
 p
ric
es
 (
fir
st
 d
at
a 
Lä
nd
er
)
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
20
-a
br
-0
0
N
O
0,
10
0,
05
0,
08
0,
05
H
ig
h 
sh
oc
k 
to
 th
e 
E
O
N
IA
Li
qu
id
ity
27
-a
br
-0
0
N
O
0,
04
0,
08
0,
07
0,
07
In
cr
ea
se
 c
am
e 
as
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
fo
r 
P
cl
on
g
M
ee
tin
g
28
-a
br
-0
0
N
O
0,
01
-0
,0
2
-0
,0
1
-0
,0
1
C
or
re
ct
io
n 
af
te
r 
th
e 
G
C
 m
ee
tin
g
M
ar
ke
t
2-
m
ay
-0
0
N
O
0,
06
0,
09
0,
09
0,
10
U
ne
xp
ec
te
dl
y 
hi
gh
 M
3 
da
ta
 a
nd
 P
M
I
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
3-
m
ay
-0
0
N
O
-0
,0
1
0,
08
0,
04
0,
04
Lo
w
er
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 o
f t
he
 e
ur
o 
M
ar
ke
t
4-
m
ay
-0
0
N
O
0,
11
0,
10
0,
14
0,
15
Lo
w
er
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 o
f t
he
 e
ur
o 
M
ar
ke
t
17
-m
ay
-0
0
N
O
0,
03
0,
15
0,
11
0,
13
H
IC
P
 
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
23
-m
ay
-0
0
N
O
0,
19
-0
,0
1
0,
07
-0
,0
1
H
ig
h 
sh
oc
k 
to
 th
e 
E
O
N
IA
Li
qu
id
ity
30
-m
ay
-0
0
N
O
0,
04
0,
09
0,
08
0,
07
H
ig
h 
M
3 
gr
ow
th
 (
29
 M
ay
) 
an
d 
sp
ee
ch
 Is
si
ng
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a 
/ C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
8-
ju
n-
00
N
O
0,
15
0,
26
0,
25
0,
26
H
ig
he
r 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
M
ee
tin
g
11
-a
go
-0
0
N
O
0,
05
0,
12
0,
11
0,
12
H
IC
P
 F
R
 a
nd
 S
P
 h
ig
h 
af
te
r 
th
e 
M
on
th
ly
 B
ul
le
tin
  (
10
 A
ug
)
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
24
-a
go
-0
0
N
O
0,
08
0,
05
0,
07
0,
07
P
ro
du
ce
r 
pr
ic
es
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
an
d 
liq
ui
di
ty
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a 
/ l
iq
ui
di
ty
5-
oc
t-
00
N
O
0,
07
0,
07
0,
09
0,
09
In
cr
ea
se
 w
as
 p
ar
tly
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e
M
ee
tin
g
19
-d
ic
-0
0
N
O
-0
,0
3
-0
,0
8
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
7
H
IC
P
 (
hi
gh
) 
/ t
al
ks
 o
f g
en
er
al
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
n 
of
 fa
lli
ng
 r
at
es
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a 
/ M
ar
ke
ts
(1
):
 In
 b
ol
d 
if 
th
e 
sh
oc
k 
is
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
(d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
la
rg
er
 th
an
 tw
ic
e 
its
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 0
.0
38
 b
p)
(2
):
 D
ue
 to
 ju
m
ps
 in
 E
O
N
IA
 (
an
d 
to
 a
 le
ss
er
 e
xt
en
t i
n 
th
e 
1-
w
ee
k 
ra
te
),
 th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 s
ho
ck
s 
al
so
 o
cc
ur
re
d 
on
19
99
: 2
4 
M
ar
, 2
2 
A
pr
, 1
9-
20
 M
ay
, 2
1-
23
 J
ul
y,
 1
7-
18
-2
3 
A
ug
, 1
7-
23
 S
ep
,1
8-
22
 O
ct
, 2
2 
N
ov
, 2
2-
30
 D
ec
20
00
: 1
9-
20
 A
pr
il,
 2
2-
23
 M
ay
, 2
3-
24
 A
ug
, 2
2 
S
ep
, 2
1 
D
ec
N
ot
e:
 a
 m
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
su
rp
ris
e 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
hi
gh
er
 o
r 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 tw
o 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
. T
he
 la
st
 tw
o 
co
lu
m
ns
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
el
ab
or
at
ed
 c
he
ck
in
g 
in
 B
lo
om
be
rg
th
e 
ne
w
s 
w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
be
en
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
m
ov
er
s 
of
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
ts
 o
n 
th
at
 d
ay
.
T
ab
le
 3
a:
 M
ai
n
 m
o
n
et
ar
y 
p
o
lic
y 
su
rp
ri
se
s 
in
 t
h
e 
eu
ro
 a
re
a 
in
 1
99
9 
an
d
 2
00
0
D
at
e
M
ee
tin
g
S
h
o
ck
s 
(in
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
p
o
in
ts
) 
(1
)
C
o
m
m
en
ts
E
xp
la
na
tio
n
44
P
C
sh
o
rt
 (2
)
P
cl
o
n
g
P
C
al
l
P
C
n
o
e(
3)
4-
en
e-
01
N
O
-0
,0
3
-0
,1
2
-0
,0
9
-0
,1
0
S
ur
pr
is
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
F
ed
 F
un
d 
ra
te
s 
an
d 
eu
ro
 w
ea
kn
es
s
M
ar
ke
t
9-
en
e-
01
N
O
0,
02
0,
08
0,
06
0,
07
pr
od
uc
er
 p
ric
es
 a
nd
 (
to
 a
 le
ss
er
 e
xt
en
t)
 r
et
ai
l s
al
es
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
10
-e
ne
-0
1
N
O
0,
01
0,
07
0,
05
0,
05
Is
si
ng
 (
"F
ed
 d
ec
is
io
n 
ha
s 
no
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
E
C
B
")
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
20
-f
eb
-0
1
N
O
0,
12
0,
03
0,
09
0,
09
W
el
te
ke
 (
"in
fla
tio
n 
ris
ks
 h
av
e 
no
t v
an
is
he
d"
)
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
23
-f
eb
-0
1
N
O
-0
,1
3
-0
,0
2
-0
,0
9
-0
,0
8
G
er
m
an
 p
ro
du
ce
r 
pr
ic
es
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t t
al
ks
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a 
/ M
ar
ke
t
21
-m
ar
-0
1
N
O
-0
,0
5
-0
,0
9
-0
,0
8
-0
,0
7
IF
O
 d
ec
lin
e 
an
d 
D
ui
se
nb
er
g 
("
ris
ks
 m
or
e 
ba
la
nc
ed
")
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a 
/ C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
10
-a
br
-0
1
N
O
0,
22
0,
06
0,
15
0,
12
W
el
te
ke
 (
"s
te
ad
y 
ha
nd
 a
pp
ro
ac
h"
) 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
t t
al
ks
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
/ M
ar
ke
t /
Li
qu
id
ity
11
-a
br
-0
1
N
O
0,
12
0,
17
0,
17
0,
16
E
xp
ec
ta
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 th
e 
lo
ng
 r
un
M
ee
tin
g
18
-a
br
-0
1
N
O
-0
,0
9
-0
,0
8
-0
,1
0
-0
,1
0
F
ed
 c
ut
 r
at
es
F
ed
 M
ee
tin
g
10
-m
ay
-0
1
N
O
-0
,1
4
-0
,2
2
-0
,2
2
-0
,2
3
T
he
 c
ut
 w
as
 n
ot
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
(d
is
to
rt
io
n 
in
 M
3)
M
ee
tin
g
29
-ju
n-
01
N
O
-0
,0
1
0,
08
0,
05
0,
06
M
3 
da
ta
 h
ig
he
r 
th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
11
-s
ep
-0
1
N
O
0,
00
-0
,1
7
-0
,1
0
-0
,1
1
T
er
ro
ris
t a
tta
ck
 to
 th
e 
U
S
T
er
ro
ris
t s
ho
ck
17
-s
ep
-0
1
N
O
-0
,2
8
-0
,3
0
-0
,3
6
-0
,3
6
C
on
ce
rt
ed
 c
ut
 o
f 5
0 
ba
si
s 
po
in
ts
M
ee
tin
g
19
-s
ep
-0
1
N
O
-0
,1
4
-0
,0
9
-0
,1
3
-0
,1
1
T
er
ro
ris
t s
ho
ck
20
-s
ep
-0
1
N
O
0,
08
0,
03
0,
08
0,
09
T
er
ro
ris
t s
ho
ck
21
-s
ep
-0
1
N
O
0,
08
-0
,1
1
-0
,0
5
-0
,1
0
IF
O
 lo
w
er
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
T
er
ro
ris
t s
ho
ck
 / 
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
9-
oc
t-
01
N
O
0,
12
0,
06
0,
11
0,
12
In
du
st
ria
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 G
er
m
an
y 
(?
)
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
15
-o
ct
-0
1
N
O
-0
,0
4
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
8
16
-o
ct
-0
1
N
O
0,
16
0,
01
0,
10
0,
07
7-
no
v-
01
N
O
-0
,1
2
-0
,0
9
-0
,1
3
-0
,1
3
E
ur
o 
ar
ea
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
nf
id
en
ce
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a
5-
di
c-
01
N
O
-0
,0
1
0,
08
0,
04
0,
04
N
A
P
M
-I
S
M
 h
ig
h 
an
d 
fa
ll 
of
 th
e 
eu
ro
E
co
no
m
ic
 d
at
a/
 M
ar
ke
t
21
-m
ay
-0
2
N
O
0,
01
-0
,0
7
-0
,0
4
-0
,0
5
E
P
 H
ea
rin
g 
D
ui
se
nb
er
g 
(s
lo
w
 r
ec
ov
er
y)
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
(1
):
 In
 b
ol
d 
if 
th
e 
sh
oc
k 
is
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
(d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
la
rg
er
 th
an
 tw
ic
e 
its
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 0
.0
38
 b
p)
(2
):
 D
ue
 to
 ju
m
ps
 in
 E
O
N
IA
 (
an
d 
to
 a
 le
ss
er
 e
xt
en
t i
n 
th
e 
1-
w
ee
k 
ra
te
),
 th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 c
on
si
de
rs
 th
at
 a
ls
o 
sh
oc
ks
 o
cc
ur
re
d 
on
20
01
: 2
3 
Ja
n,
 1
6-
22
 F
eb
, 2
3 
A
pr
il,
 2
1 
Ju
ne
, 2
3 
O
ct
, 1
3-
20
 N
ov
, 2
1-
28
 D
ec
20
02
: 
23
 J
an
, 2
1 
M
ar
ch
, 2
2-
23
 A
pr
il,
 2
1 
M
ay
(2
):
 T
hi
s 
m
ea
su
re
 s
ig
na
ls
 a
ls
o 
a 
sh
oc
k 
on
 2
7 
D
ec
 2
00
1 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 y
ea
r 
ef
fe
ct
N
ot
e:
 a
 m
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
su
rp
ris
e 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
hi
gh
er
 o
r 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 tw
o 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
. T
he
 la
st
 tw
o 
co
lu
m
ns
 h
av
e 
be
en
 e
la
bo
ra
te
d 
ch
ec
ki
ng
 in
 B
lo
om
be
rg
th
e 
ne
w
s 
w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
be
en
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
m
ov
er
s 
of
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
ts
 o
n 
th
at
 d
ay
.
S
pe
ec
he
s 
E
U
 o
ffi
ci
al
s 
(n
ee
d 
to
 c
ut
 r
at
es
) 
an
d 
E
C
B
 m
em
be
rs
 
(n
ee
d 
to
 w
ai
t a
nd
 a
ss
es
s 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n)
E
xp
la
n
at
io
n
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
T
ab
le
 3
b
: 
M
ai
n
 m
o
n
et
ar
y 
p
o
lic
y 
su
rp
ri
se
s 
in
 t
h
e 
eu
ro
 a
re
a 
in
 2
00
1 
an
d
 2
00
2
S
h
o
ck
s 
(i
n
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
p
o
in
ts
) 
(1
)
D
at
e
M
ee
tin
g
C
o
m
m
en
ts
45
P
R
 
P
R
1
16
-n
ov
-9
9
0,
25
0,
08
0,
07
P
ar
tly
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
in
cr
ea
se
3-
en
e-
01
-0
,5
0
-0
,2
9
-0
,2
6
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
50
 b
p 
cu
t. 
U
ns
ch
ed
ul
ed
 m
ee
tin
g
18
-a
br
-0
1
-0
,5
0
-0
,4
2
-0
,3
5
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
50
 b
p 
cu
t. 
U
ns
ch
ed
ul
ed
 m
ee
tin
g
15
-m
ay
-0
1
-0
,5
0
-0
,0
8
-0
,1
2
P
ar
tly
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
cu
t
27
-ju
n-
01
-0
,2
5
0,
08
0,
09
C
ut
 s
lig
ht
ly
 lo
w
er
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d
17
-s
ep
-0
1
-0
,5
0
-0
,1
3
-0
,1
4
C
on
ce
rt
ed
 in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
cu
t. 
U
ns
ch
ed
ul
ed
 m
ee
tin
g
2-
oc
t-
01
-0
,5
0
-0
,0
8
-0
,1
1
P
ar
tly
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
cu
t
6-
no
v-
01
-0
,5
0
-0
,1
1
-0
,1
1
P
ar
tly
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d 
cu
t
A
ll 
th
e 
sh
o
ck
s 
in
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
23
%
22
%
T
h
e 
m
ee
ti
n
g
s 
o
f 
th
e 
F
O
M
C
73
%
73
%
T
o
ta
l n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
su
rp
ri
se
s 
in
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
35
37
(1
):
 In
 b
ol
d 
if 
th
e 
sh
oc
k 
is
 a
 s
ur
pr
is
e 
(d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
la
rg
er
 th
an
 tw
ic
e 
its
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n)
N
ot
e:
 a
 m
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y 
su
rp
ris
e 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
a 
sh
oc
k 
hi
gh
er
 o
r 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 tw
o 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
%
 o
f 
sh
o
ck
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 t
o
 m
o
n
et
ar
y 
p
o
lic
y 
m
ee
tin
g
s 
o
f 
th
e 
E
C
B
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
:
T
ab
le
 4
: 
M
o
n
et
ar
y 
p
o
lic
y 
sh
o
ck
s 
o
n
 F
O
M
C
's
 m
ee
tin
g
 d
ay
s
D
at
e 
o
f 
th
e 
m
ee
ti
n
g
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
F
ed
 
F
u
n
d
 R
at
es
C
o
m
m
en
ts
S
h
o
ck
s 
(p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
p
o
in
ts
) (
1)
46
PR PR1
14-may-99 NO 0,04 0,06 HICP (higher) and inventories (higher) Economic data
22-jul-99 NO 0,02 0,06 Greenspan Testimony Communication
6-ago-99 NO 0,06 0,06 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
16-nov-99 YES 0,08 0,07 Partly unexpected increase Meeting
4-abr-00 NO -0,06 -0,08 Leading indicators and retail sales Economic data
27-abr-00 NO 0,04 0,09 Real GDP first quarter (high) and HICP (high) Economic data
2-jun-00 NO -0,10 -0,10 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
19-dic-00 YES 0,06 0,01 Slight expectation of a cut Meeting
(1): In bold if the shock is a surprise (defined as a shock larger than twice its standard deviation)
(2): Due to the end-of-year effect, the measures signal shocks on 26 Nov and 28 Dec 1999 and on 28 Nov 2000
Note: a monetary policy surprise is defined as a shock higher or lower than two standard deviations. The last two columns has been elaborated checking in 
Bloomberg the news which have been considered to be the main movers of the markets on that day.
PR PR1
2-ene-01 NO -0,09 -0,10 NAPM-ISM slumps Economic data
3-ene-01 YES -0,29 -0,26 Unexpected 50 bp cut Meeting
4-ene-01 NO -0,19 -0,24 Fall in the discount rate and market talks Meeting / Market
5-ene-01 NO -0,09 -0,11 Market talks Market
9-ene-01 NO 0,06 0,10 Retail sales (high) and optimism on the recovery Economic data / Market
15-ene-01 NO 0,08 0,10
18-ene-01 NO -0,07 -0,07 Speech Gramlich and Phil Fed. Index Economic data / Communication
30-ene-01 NO -0,07 -0,07 Consumer confidence (drops) Economic data
2-feb-01 NO 0,07 0,03 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
23-feb-01 NO -0,09 -0,08 Fall stock markets and dollar Market
28-feb-01 NO 0,07 0,04 Greenspan ("Growth better in early 2001 than in 2000") Communication
14-mar-01 NO -0,10 -0,11 OPEC may cut supply of oil (market talk ahead meeting) Market
23-mar-01 NO 0,07 0,08 Talks outlook improving Market
27-mar-01 NO 0,04 0,09 March confidence indexes (higher) Economic data
10-abr-01 NO 0,08 0,09 Speech on economic growth (Poole) and market talk Communication / Market
11-abr-01 NO 0,06 0,07 Market talks Market
18-abr-01 YES -0,42 -0,35 Unexpected 50 bp cut Meeting
4-may-01 NO -0,08 -0,13 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
10-may-01 NO 0,04 0,06 Jobless claims Economic data
11-may-01 NO 0,04 0,08 Retail sales and producer prices Economic data
15-may-01 YES -0,08 -0,12 Partly unexpected cut Meeting
27-jun-01 YES 0,08 0,09 Cut slightly lower than expected Meeting
4-sep-01 NO 0,09 0,13 NAPM-ISM Economic data
6-sep-01 NO -0,03 -0,07 NAPM-ISM  (non manufacturing) Economic data
7-sep-01 NO -0,12 -0,13 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
12-sep-01 NO -0,07 -0,07 Terrorist shocks
13-sep-01 NO -0,25 -0,24 Terrorist shocks
14-sep-01 NO -0,07 -0,08 Terrorist shocks
17-sep-01 YES -0,13 -0,14 Concerted cut of 50 basis points Meeting
18-sep-01 NO -0,07 -0,08 Terrorist shocks
19-sep-01 NO -0,15 -0,14 Beige book and Greenspan to Congress Terrorist shocks /Economic data
20-sep-01 NO 0,07 0,06 Greenspan testimony Communication
2-oct-01 YES -0,08 -0,11 Partly unexpected cut Meeting
6-nov-01 YES -0,11 -0,11 Partly unexpected cut Meeting
5-dic-01 NO 0,06 0,08 NAPM-ISM  (non manufacturing) Economic data
7-dic-01 NO -0,08 -0,09 Payrolls / Employment report Economic data
11-ene-02 NO -0,09 -0,09 Greenspan Speech and producer prices Communication / Economic data
29-mar-02 NO -0,01 -0,11
1-abr-02 NO 0,12 0,10 NAPM-ISM Economic data
(1): In bold if the shock is a surprise (defined as a shock larger than twice its standard deviation)
Note: a monetary policy surprise is defined as a shock higher or lower than two standard deviations. The last two columns has been elaborated checking in 
Bloomberg the news which have been considered to be the main movers of the markets on that day.
Date Meeting
Table 5a: Main monetary policy surprises in the United States in 1999 until 2000
Table 5b: Main monetary policy surprises in the United States in 2001-2002
Shocks (percentage points) (1)
Shocks (percentage points) (1)
Comments Explanation
Date
Explanation
Meeting
Comments
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rt = b0 + et     
et~N(0,ht), ln(ht)=l0 + l1 Xt +  d1ln(ht-l)+d2[( |et-1|/(ht-1)
1/2)] +d3[( et-1/(ht-1)
1/2-(2/p)1/2)] 
Mean Parameters
Europe. Principal 
Components (pcnoe)  US. Poole y Raasche (PR)
b0 -0,001 (0,775) 0,000 (0,670)
Variance Parameters
l0 -0,802 (0,010) -1,392 (0,002)
l1
Meeting Dummy 1,331 (0,000) 2,297 (0,000)
Lagged Meeting Dummy -1,664 (0,000) -2,779 (0,000)
d1 0,9082 (0,000) 0,8670 (0,000)
d2 0,3683 (0,000) 0,5470 (0,000)
d3 0,0021 (0,902) -0,1050 (0,087)
Log of Variance is X times 
bigger on Meeting days 1,6606 1,6501
Note: P-values of the null hypothesis that the coefficeint is equal to 0 appear in parentheses 
to the right of the parameter estimates.
Table 7: comparison of volatility in the US and the euro area
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intcpt (1) beta (1) delta1a (1) delta1b(2) delta2(2) R2 (1) DW (1)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (f)
1 year 0,00 0,82 -0,23 -0,06 -0,22 0,40 2,14
(0,95) (12,14) -(2,13) -(0,35) -(1,18)
3 years 0,00 0,69 -0,32 -0,04 -0,37 0,24 2,00
(0,93) (9,74) -(2,90) -(0,21) -(1,97)
5 years 0,00 0,63 -0,32 -0,05 -0,36 0,18 2,01
(0,99) (9,22) -(2,66) -(0,26) -(1,85)
10 years 0,00 0,43 -0,29 -0,08 -0,28 0,10 2,01
(1,02) (7,47) -(3,21) -(0,48) -(1,73)
No meet (s) Meeting (s) Move (s) No move (nos)
(b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d)
1 year 0,82 0,59 0,54 0,77
3 years 0,69 0,37 0,28 0,65
5 years 0,63 0,31 0,23 0,59
10years 0,43 0,14 0,07 0,35
The intercept was not signficant. t statistics in parenthesis
(1) Equation 5a, (2) Equation 5b
(s) stands for significant (in bold) and (nos) for not-significant at 95%
Estimates incorporates 1 lag of the dependant variable. Estimation with LS and Newley West (NW) adjusted errors
Estimates of 5a substituting Dmeet by Dmove,Dnomove showed that all were significantly different from 0
intcpt (1) beta (1) delta1a (1) delta1b(2) delta2(2) R2 (1) DW (1)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (f)
3 years 0,00 0,83 -0,36 0,05 -0,56 0,24 2,00
(1,06) (12,10) -(3,20) (0,30) -(3,22)
5 years 0,00 0,76 -0,36 0,06 -0,57 0,18 2,01
(1,09) (11,79) -(2,92) (0,30) -(2,71)
10 years 0,00 0,54 -0,32 0,03 -0,47 0,10 2,01
(1,07) (9,66) -(3,31) (0,16) -(2,68)
No meet (s) Meeting (s) Move (s) No move (nos)
(b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d)
3 years 0,83 0,46 0,31 0,88
5 years 0,76 0,41 0,26 0,82
10years 0,54 0,22 0,09 0,56
The intercept was not signficant t-statistics in parenthesis
(1) Equation 5a, (2) Equation 5b
(s) stands for significant (in bold) and nos for not-significant at 95%
Estimates incorporates 1 lag of the dependant variable. Estimation with LS and Newley West (NW) adjusted errors
Estimates of 5a substituting Dmeet by Dmove,Dnomove showed that all were significantly different from 0
Impact on the respective yield from the following dummies
Table 8a. Measuring the impact of monetary policy surprises in bond yields with Pcnoe
Impact on the respective yield from the following dummies
Table 8b. Measuring the impact of monetary policy surprises in bond yields with Pclong
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Implicits beta
 (1)
betat-1
 (1) delta1a (1) delta1at-1 
(1) delta1b(2) delta1bt-1
(2) delta2(2) delta2t-1
(2)
(b) (b1) (c) (c1) (d) (d1) (f) (f1)
1 year 0,82 0,14 -0,23 0,01 -0,04 0,14 -0,24 -0,18
(12,70) (2,54) -(2,10) (0,07) -(0,30) (0,92) -(1,31) -(1,05)
2 year 0,69 0,23 -0,50 -0,04 -0,37 0,10 -0,16 -0,17
(8,47) (2,60) -(3,26) -(0,34) -(1,91) (0,63) -(0,65) -(1,13)
3 year 0,70 -0,09 -0,49 0,01 -0,35 0,23 -0,17 -0,29
(7,24) -(0,88) -(2,61) (0,08) -(1,71) (1,60) -(0,72) -(1,56)
4 year 0,74 -0,06 -0,79 -0,05 -0,38 -0,60 -0,54 0,71
(6,67) -(0,54) -(2,98) -(0,26) -(1,38) -(2,44) -(1,45) (2,52)
5 year 0,53 -0,05 -0,38 -0,11 -0,37 0,00 -0,16 0,00
(6,11) -(0,70) -(3,75) -(1,03) (0,00) (0,00) -(0,99) (0,00)
6 year 0,19 0,05 -0,11 -0,01 0,18 0,00 -0,34 -0,06
(1,28) (0,46) -(0,55) -(0,09) (0,00) (0,00) -(1,11) -(0,26)
7 year 0,14 0,05 -0,16 -0,33 0,07 -0,53 -0,30 0,26
(1,03) (0,44) -(0,98) -(2,45) (0,34) -(1,79) -(1,56) (0,88)
8 year 0,13 -0,28 -0,11 -0,09 0,02 -0,27 -0,17 0,23
(1,03) -(1,90) -(0,61) -(0,55) (0,06) -(1,11) -(0,50) (0,86)
9 year 0,23 -0,08 -0,32 0,02 -0,16 0,20 -0,21 -0,24
(2,11) -(0,71) -(2,23) (0,13) -(0,69) (0,77) -(0,97) -(0,89)
10 year 0,27 -0,05 -0,16 -0,19 -0,13 -0,29 -0,04 0,13
(2,60) -(0,36) -(1,04) -(1,05) -(0,40) -(1,12) -(0,13) (0,47)
No meet Meeting Move No move No meet Meeting Move No move 
(b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d) (b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d)
1 year 0,82 0,59 0,54 0,78 0,96 0,74 0,64 1,06
2 year 0,69 0,19 0,16 0,32 0,92 0,38 0,31 0,64
3 year 0,70 0,21 0,17 0,35 0,61 0,13 0,03 0,49
4 year 0,74 -0,05 -0,18 0,36 0,68 -0,16 -0,12 -0,29
5 year 0,53 0,15 0,01 0,17 0,48 -0,01 -0,05 0,11
6 year 0,19 0,08 0,03 0,37 0,24 0,12 0,03 0,42
7 year 0,14 -0,01 -0,09 0,22 0,20 -0,30 -0,31 -0,26
8 year 0,13 0,02 -0,02 0,15 -0,15 -0,35 -0,34 -0,40
9 year 0,23 -0,09 -0,14 0,07 0,15 -0,15 -0,25 0,20
10 year 0,27 0,11 0,10 0,14 0,22 -0,13 -0,11 -0,20
t statistics in parenthesis. The constant is not significant
(1) Equation 5a, (2) Equation 5b
(s) stands for significant (in bold) and nos for not-significant at 95%
Estimates incorporates one lag of the dependent varialble. Estimation with LS and Newley West (NW) adjusted errors
Averages beta
 (1)
betat-1
 (1) delta1a (1) delta1at-1 
(1) delta1b(2) delta1bt-1
(2) delta2(2) delta2t-1
(2)
(b) (b1) (c) (c1) (d) (d1) (f) (f1)
medium(3) 0,29 -0,02 -0,21 -0,12 -0,04 -0,19 -0,23 0,09
(4,67) -(0,38) -(2,31) -(1,42) -(0,24) -(1,53) -(1,36) (0,64)
long (4) 0,23 -0,19 -0,22 -0,02 -0,12 -0,08 -0,13 0,07
(3,24) -(2,64) -(2,27) -(0,22) -(0,60) -(0,52) -(0,72) (0,39)
No meet Meeting Move No move No meet Meeting Move No move 
(b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d) (b) (b+c) (b+d+f) (b+d)
medium(3) 0,29 0,08 0,03 0,25 0,27 -0,06 -0,10 0,04
long (4) 0,23 0,01 -0,03 0,11 0,04 -0,21 -0,23 -0,16
t statistics in parenthesis. The constant is not significant
(1) Equation 5a, (2) Equation 5b
(3) Average of implicit rates from the fourth to the sixth year (both included)  
(4) Average of implicit rates from the seventh to the ninth year (both included)
(s) stands for significant (in bold) and nos for not-significant at 95%
Estimates incorporates one lag of the dependent varialble. Estimation with LS and Newley West (NW) adjusted errors
With no lags With one lag
Table 9a. Measuring the impact of monetary policy surprises on implicit rates with Pcnoe
Impact on the respective yield from the following dummies
Table 9b . Measuring the impact of monetary policy surprises on implicit rates with Pcnoe
Impact on the respective yield from the following dummies
With no lags With one lag
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Coefficient EONIA PCshort PCnoe PCall PClong
Et(Akt+1) 4,11 12,19 0,54 1,61 0,12
(4,28) (0,51) (0,04) (0,12) (0,01)
At meeting 7,88 34,96 24,35 23,48 23,89
(5,93) (1,10) (1,73) (1,72) (1,61)
End maintenance period -6,54 -24,93 -3,55 -5,10 -1,25
-(3,87) -(0,27) -(0,13) -(0,22) -(0,04)
Beginning maintenance period -6,24 -28,04 -0,55 -8,19 0,34
-(4,74) -(0,87) -(0,01) -(0,25) (0,01)
Avg. Log likelihood -0,03 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01
Pseudo R2 0,59 0,97 0,85 0,86 0,87
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. 
Table A. Ordered probit estimates
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